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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3 la-19(1) and 
78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err by denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration when the 
negotiated Addendum to the parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract mandates that "[a]ny 
disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by the parties agreed upon 
by both Buyer and Seller"? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. (See R. at 483-498, 549-50). The trial 
court's decision denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration presents a question of law, which 
this Court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's 
decision. See Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Section 78-31a-4(l) of the Utah Arbitration Act provides: 
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an 
issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration 
agreement or the scope of matters covered by the agreement, the 
court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 (1999). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case is based upon a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Purchase Contract") 
entered into on June 14, 1998, between Central Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), as Buyer, 
and Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates (collectively "PWA"), as Sellers. 
(See R. at 26-31). Under the Purchase Contract, CFI was entitled to purchase approximately 
twenty (20) acres of real property in Summit County, Utah, "subject to" certain "Special 
Contingencies" being satisfied. (See R. at 29). 
The Special Contingencies required, among other things, that Summit County grant 
final Master Plan approval of the intended development, and that CFFs purchase of the 
property close on or before December 31, 1998. (See R. at 29). Because the Special 
Contingencies were not satisfied, including failure to close the transaction within the 
prescribed time period, PWA understood that the Purchase Contract expired by its own terms 
on January 1, 1999. (See R. at 101-115). Nevertheless, on November 9,1999, CFI filed this 
action against PWA, seeking specific performance of the Purchase Contract and damages for 
alleged breaches of the Purchase Contract. (See R. at 1-7). CFI also recorded a Notice of Lis 
Pendens on the Property. (See R. at 88-90). PWA immediately notified CFI of its obligation 
to arbitrate, and requested CFI to dismiss its Complaint and release the Notice of Lis Pendens. 
(See R. at 17-19). 
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When CFI refused to comply with PWA's request to arbitrate, PWA was forced to take 
necessary measures in the trial court to obtain the immediate release of the Notice of Lis 
Pendens, which was impeding development of The Canyons Specially Planned Area. (See 
R. at 34-115). PWA thereafter moved the trial court to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
arbitration provision in the Addendum to the Purchase Contract. (See R. at 483-98). The trial 
court denied PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See R. at 549-50). 
Pursuantto Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-19(1), PWA sought immediate review of the trial 
court's decision denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See R. at 552-55). PWA also 
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in the trial court pending this Court's review of the trial 
court's decision. (See R. at 576-85). When the trial court denied that motion (see R. at 768-
70), PWA filed a similar motion with this Court. By Order dated October 17,2000, this Court 
stayed all proceedings in the trial court pending the outcome of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. On June 14,1998, CFI and PWA executed the Purchase Contract. The Purchase 
Contract, subject to certain Special Contingencies being met, allowed CFI to purchase 
approximately twenty (20) acres of real property in the "Frostwood Development" at The 
Canyons Specially Planned Area in Summit County, Utah (the "Property"). (See Purchase 
Contract, Addendum "A" hereto; R. at 26-31). 
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B. CFI, one of the world's largest timeshare development companies, intended to 
buy the Property to build a 400-unit timeshare project before the 2002 Winter Olympics. (See 
Affidavit of Mark Waltrip, R. at 290-99; see also R. at 658). 
C. The Purchase Contract originated from a pre-printed form used regularly by 
members of the Utah Association of Realtors. (See Affidavit of Walter J. Plumb, III ("Plumb 
Aff") at t 5, Addendum "B" hereto; R. at 152-60). 
D. Paragraph 12 of the pre-printed body of the Purchase Contract contains a 
boilerplate dispute resolution/mediation clause that would have required the parties to submit 
disputes under the Purchase Contract to mediation before litigating them, if necessary. (See 
R. at 28, Addendum "A" hereto). 
E. CFI and PWA, however, desired to modify and clarify certain provisions of the 
Purchase Contract, including the standard dispute resolution clause. (See Plumb Aff. at fflj 
5-7, Addendum "B" hereto; R. at 157-59). Accordingly, on June 14,1998, in connection with 
the execution of the Purchase Contract, CFI and PWA also executed Addendum No. 1 to the 
Purchase Contract (the "Contract Addendum"). (See R. at 30-31, Addendum "A" hereto). 
F. Section 12 of the Contract Addendum contains an arbitration clause (the 
"Arbitration Clause"), which changed the standard method of dispute resolution contained in 
the body of the Purchase Contract. The Arbitration Clause provides: 
Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be 
arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both buyer and seller. If 
agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning 
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of the arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money back and 
this agreement shall be null and void. 
(See R. at 30, Addendum "A" hereto). 
G. PWA negotiated to include the Arbitration Clause in the Contract Addendum 
to avoid litigation and prevent delays in developing the Property. PWA desired to complete 
the development before the 2002 Winter Olympics. (See Plumb Aff. at ^ 7, Addendum "B" 
hereto; R. at 157). 
H. CFI likewise desired to avoid delays in its purchase and construction of the 
Property, to ensure that the time-share units would be completed by the 2002 Winter 
Olympics. (See Affidavit of David A. Seigel, at ^ 7; R. at 269-76). 
I. The provisions of the Contract Addendum, including the Arbitration Clause, 
superseded the conflicting provisions in the body of the Purchase Contract. The Contract 
Addendum states: "To the extent the terms of this Addendum modify or conflict with any 
provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counter offers, these terms shall 
control." (See R. at 31, Addendum "A" hereto). 
J. Section 16 of the Purchase Contract (the "Default Clause") states that where a 
section of the Purchase Contract "provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that the 
remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under 
common law." (See R. at 31, Addendum "A" hereto). 
K. Section 9 of the Purchase Contract sets forth Special Contingencies, which 
PWA believes were not timely satisfied, causing the Purchase Contract to terminate on its 
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own terms because the transaction failed to close on or before December 31, 1998. (See 
PWA's Answer and Counterclaim at fflf 10-23; R. at 45-48). 
L. On November 9, 1999 - nearly eleven (11) months after the deadline for 
closing the transaction, and on the eve of Summit County's approval of the 7,000 acre 
development of The Canyons Specially Planned Area ("The Canyons SPA"), of which PWA's 
property was a part - CFI filed this action against PWA, seeking specific performance of the 
Purchase Contract, damages for alleged breaches of the Purchase Contract, and other relief. 
(See R. at 1 -7). CFI also recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the Property. (See R. at 88-90). 
M. Three days later, by letter dated November 12, 1999, PWA notified CFI that 
filing the Complaint violated the Arbitration Clause, and that the Notice of Lis Pendens was 
improper: 
Due to the termination of the Purchase Contract, the filing of the 
Complaint and recording of the lis pendens was improper. 
Paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1 expressly provides that 'any 
disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated 
by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller.' Paragraph 12 
was included in the parties' agreement for the express purpose of 
avoiding litigation. More importantly, this paragraph supersedes 
and replaces section 15 of the Purchase Agreement in that it 
conflicts with the rights of the parties to submit the matter to 
mediation. Since the terms of the Addendum modify and conflict 
with section 15, the terms of Addendum No. 1 control. 
(See 11/12/99 letter, Addendum "C" hereto; R. at 17-19). The letter not only requested CFI 
to arbitrate the parties' dispute, but also requested CFI to dismiss the Complaint and release 
the Notice of Lis Pendens. (See id.). 
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N. On December 13, 1999, because CFI refused to dismiss the Complaint or 
release the Notice of Lis Pendens, PWA filed a Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, requesting 
the trial court to dismiss the claims against PWA and cancel the Notice of Lis Pendens 
recorded against the Property. (See R. at 59-115). The Motion sought dismissal for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, based on the termination of the Purchase 
Contract by its own terms for failure to close the purchase by December 31, 1998. (See R. 
at 101-115). The Motion also explained that the Notice of Lis Pendens jeopardized the 
development entitlements granted by Summit County in approving The Canyons SPA.1 (See 
R. at 93-106). Alternatively, the Motion asserted that if the trial court did not dismiss the 
claims against PWA, the trial court should enter an order compelling arbitration in accordance 
with the Arbitration Clause: 
[Bjecause Addendum No. 1 provides that its terms govern over 
any inconsistent terms contained in the Purchase Contract, the 
provisions in Addendum No. 1 requiring arbitration are 
controlling. As a result, in the event this Court denies PWA's 
Motion to Dismiss, at the very least, the Court should enter an 
The Canyons SPA is a master-planned resort community on 7,000 acres of land. 
PWA's property was part of The Canyons SPA. As a requirement of development 
approval, a portion of PWA's property was to be developed into four holes of an 
eighteen-hole golf course. Development of the golf course was subject to strict 
deadlines, and was one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the 
development of The Canyons SPA. The Canyons SPA was to be developed in phases 
by expanding outward from the inner "Resort Core," which was adjacent to PWA's 
property. Thus, construction of the outer areas was conditioned upon progress in 
developing the inner Resort Core, including PWA's property and the golf course. As 
a result, CWsLis Pendens was a serious impediment to the development of the entire 
Canyons SPA, not just to PWA's property. (See R. at 105-06; see also various 
affidavits at R. at 116-193). 
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order compelling the parties to submit the matter to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract. 
(See Memo, in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 14 n.3, Addendum "D" hereto; R. at 93-115). 
O. On December 13, 1999, the same day on which PWA filed its Motion to 
Dismiss and Quiet Title, PWA also filed an Answer and Counterclaim, which explicitly 
referred to the Arbitration Clause, quoting it verbatim and asserting that filing the Complaint 
and initiating litigation violated the Arbitration Clause. (See Counterclaim ^j 14, 41 & 42, 
Addendum "E" hereto; R. at 34-57). 
P. On January 14,2000, the trial court issued a written opinion concerning PWA's 
Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, in the form of a Minute Entry. The trial court dismissed 
CFFs claims for specific performance and ordered the release of the Notice of Lis Pendens. 
The trial court, however, did not dismiss CFFs remaining claims for breach of contract. (See 
Minute Entry, Addendum "F" hereto; R. at 423-26). 
R. On February 28, 2000, in accordance with its Minute Entry, the trial court 
entered an Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title. (See Order on 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, Addendum "G" hereto; R. at 461-63). 
U. On March 9, 2000, because the trial court did not dismiss all of CFFs claims, 
PWA filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Motion to Compel") pursuant to the Arbitration 
Clause, seeking an order compelling CFI to arbitrate its remaining claims. (See R. at 483-98). 
V. On March 22, 2000, CFI filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to 
Compel, arguing that PWA had waived its right to pursue arbitration. (See R. at 513-528). 
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W. On April 3,2000, PWA filed a reply memorandum explaining in detail why its 
actions in this case did not constitute a waiver of its right to arbitration. (See R. at 530-42). 
X. On May 17, 2000, the trial court held a hearing on PWA's Motion to Compel. 
At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court denied the Motion to Compel as follows: 
I think there is a policy and it's continuing to evolve to favor 
arbitration agreements, and I think the Courts where they can, do 
compel arbitration. I think because one, it's a more rapid remedy; 
one [sic], it's agreed upon between the parties; and perhaps - 1 hope 
that's not my motivation - is because it relieves the Court's docket 
somewhat. Nevertheless, people have a right to their day in Court, 
unless there is a clear arbitration alternative. 
Now, the waiver argument, there is [sic] certainly actions by the 
defendant that were inconsistent with the arbitration. On the other 
hand, there were actions that were consistent. I am not persuaded 
that waiver applies in this case, but that doesn't resolve the issue for 
me, because before a Court should order arbitration, I think it needs 
to be persuaded that arbitration is a bonafide option. 
As I look at this case as carefully as I can, I look at the arbitration 
provision. I think it was appropriately used by the defendants and 
relied upon by the Court to some extent in ruling on the lis pendens 
and the other issues in January to determine that in fact there was 
any - it was evident of the intent of the parties to not impede the 
project. I think that's clear, but the more I look at that provision, I 
think it's not even an arbitration provision. In any event, if I was to 
refer this matter or compel arbitration, I think I would be 
compelling plaintiffs to go into a forum where they are almost 
doomed to no remedy, nothing more than to be back where they 
were before, and I don't think that's an appropriate use of the 
arbitration mechanism. I'm denying the motion. 
(See Hearing Transcript, Addendum "H" hereto; R. at 762-63). 
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Y. The trial court's Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration was 
entered on May 25, 2000. (See Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration, 
Addendum "I" hereto; R. at 549-50). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred by denying PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration. The 
Arbitration Clause reflects the parties' unmistakable intent to arbitrate any disputes 
concerning the Purchase Contract. The first sentence of the Arbitration Clause plainly states 
that "[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed 
upon by both Buyer and Seller." (R. at 30) (emphasis added). Moreover, the parties included 
the Arbitration Clause in the Contract Addendum to replace the boilerplate dispute resolution 
clause that otherwise would have permitted litigation. The parties agreed to arbitrate any 
disputes in order to avoid delays in the development of the Property. Their overriding 
objective was to complete the development before the 2002 Winter Olympics. The trial court 
improperly focused on the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause, and, as a result, failed 
to give effect to the parties' intention to arbitrate their disputes. The trial court disregarded 
basic and controlling principles of contract interpretation. 
CFI may argue that PWA waived its right to arbitrate this dispute. That argument fails. 
Upon service of CFI's Complaint and receipt of CFI's Notice of Lis Pendens, PWA 
immediately notified CFI that it had violated the Arbitration Clause by initiating litigation. 
PWA requested CFI to dismiss the Complaint and release the Notice of Lis Pendens. CFI 
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refused. Thus, to remove the Notice of Lis Pendens and protect its legal interests, PWA 
simultaneously filed a Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, and an Answer and Counterclaim. 
Both pleadings referenced the Arbitration Clause and asserted that this matter should be 
arbitrated, not litigated. Nine days after the trial court entered its order on the Motion to 
Dismiss and Quiet Title (which dismissed some but not all of CFFs claims), PWA formally 
moved the court for an order compelling arbitration. In short, PWA did not participate in this 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. Moreover, CFI cannot 
demonstrate that it has been unduly prejudiced by PWA's participation in this litigation. 
Hence, under the standards set forth in Chandlery. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 
356 (Utah 1992), PWA has not waived its right to arbitration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO COMPEL CFI TO ARBITRATE 
ITS DISPUTE WITH PWA. 
"[Arbitration agreements are favored in Utah." Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 359 
(Utah 1996). It is this Court's "policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner that favors 
arbitration;' Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Bradv Systems. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 
1986). By statute, if an agreement to arbitrate exists, a court is required to order the parties 
to arbitrate upon proper motion. The Utah Arbitration Act states: "The court, upon motion 
of any party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to 
arbitrate." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1999) (emphasis added). 
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Here, the Arbitration Clause represents an enforceable arbitration agreement. It is 
contained in the Contract Addendum, which the parties negotiated at arms-length in 
connection with a sophisticated transaction. The first sentence of the Arbitration Clause 
unambiguously requires the parties to arbitrate their disputes. It states: "Any disagreement 
over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer 
and Seller." (R. at 30) (emphasis added). This provision could not have set forth more 
plainly the parties' intention to arbitrate disputes over the terms of the Purchase Contract. 
In denying PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration, however, the trial court fixated on 
the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause, which states: "If agreement cannot be reached 
within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process, Buyer shall receive its money 
back and this agreement shall be null and void." (R. at 30). This provision sets forth the 
stipulated remedy to be ordered by the arbitrators if the parties cannot reach an agreement 
within 60 days after arbitration begins. The trial court, however, erroneously construed this 
language to defeat the parties' clear intention, embodied in the first sentence of the Arbitration 
Clause, to arbitrate their disputes. 
The hearing transcript reveals that the trial court denied arbitration because it was 
uncomfortable with the potential result of the arbitration process. The trial court stated: "[I]f 
I was to refer this matter or compel arbitration, I think I would be compelling plaintiffs to go 
into a forum where they are almost doomed to no remedy, nothing more than to be back 
where they were before." (R. at 763, Addendum "G" hereto). As explained below, it was 
improper for the trial court to deny arbitration simply because it disapproved of the remedy 
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bargained for by the parties. The trial court, in essence, attempted to re-write the parties' 
contract. The trial court's decision does not comport with fundamental principles of contract 
interpretation, nor with sound policies favoring arbitration. 
A. The Trial Court's Decision Violated Established Principles of Contract 
Interpretation By Failing to Give Effect to the Parties' Express Intentions. 
The trial court's refusal to compel arbitration violates cardinal rules of contract 
interpretation. The Arbitration Clause, as with other contractual provisions, must be 
interpreted in accordance with the parties' intentions. See Reed v. Davis County School DisU 
892 P.2d 1063, 1064-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Where the language employed is clear and 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of that language. 
See id. at 1065. Here, not only is the language of the Arbitration Clause unambiguous, but 
it was included to replace the standard dispute resolution clause that otherwise would have 
permitted litigation. This demonstrates an unmistakable intent to arbitrate rather than litigate 
disputes concerning the terms of the Purchase Contract. 
The parties specifically chose not to use the standard-form language in the body of the 
Purchase Contract regarding dispute resolution, which would have required them first to 
submit disputes to mediation before proceeding with litigation. (See Purchase Contract ^ J15, 
Addendum "A" hereto; R. at 28). By negotiating and executing the Contract Addendum, 
however, the parties modified certain provisions in the Purchase Contract, including the 
standard dispute resolution clause. The Contract Addendum explains: "To the extent the 
terms of this Addendum modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC,.. . these terms 
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shall control." (R. at 26, Addendum "A" hereto). Hence, the Arbitration Clause (in 
Paragraph 12 of the Contract Addendum), providing that "[a]ny disagreement over the terms 
of this agreement shall be arbitrated," superseded the standard dispute resolution clause in the 
body of the Purchase Contract. The parties' replacement of the standard clause with the 
Arbitration Clause provides strong evidence of their intent to arbitrate disputes under the 
Purchase Contract. 
The affidavits submitted to the trial court in connection with PWA's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration provide further evidence of the parties' intent to arbitrate any disputes under the 
Purchase Contract. The Affidavit of Walter J. Plumb, III, states: 
As a further condition of the Purchase Contract, the partners of 
PWA expressly negotiated a provision to avoid future litigation 
at all costs. In particular, Addendum No. 1 modified the 
Purchase Contract to provide that any disagreement over the 
terms 'shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer 
and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from 
the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its 
money back and this agreement shall be null and void.' The 
purpose of including this provision was to avoid the very 
litigation PWA finds itself involved in presently and because of 
the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics. Any delay would be 
crippling to the development of the Property. 
(Plumb Aff. % 7, Addendum "B" hereto; R. at 157). Even the Affidavit of David A. Siegel, 
a principal of CFI, indicates CFI's desire to avoid delays in its purchase and construction of 
the Property to ensure that the time-share units would be completed by the 2002 Winter 
Olympics. (See Affidavit of David A. Seigel at ^ 7; R. at 269-76). Simply put, the parties 
desired to avoid litigation at all costs, and therefore agreed to arbitrate any disputes under the 
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Purchase Contract. Their intentions in this respect were unequivocal. The trial court erred 
in declining to compel arbitration. 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Harmonize Both Sentences of the Arbitration 
Clause and Disregarded the Parties' Right to Define Their Arbitration 
Process and the Arbitrators5 Authority. 
It is a fundamental principle of contract interpretation that courts should give effect to 
the parties' intentions by harmonizing "all of [the contract's] provisions and all of its terms, 
and all of its terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Baglev & Co.. 928 P.2d 1047,1053 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). cert, denied. 
937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997); see also Armiio v. Prudential Ins. Co.. 72 F.3d 793, 799 (10th Cir. 
1995) (affirming decision to compel arbitration and explaining that, whenever possible, courts 
should "interpret one provision so as to avoid negating another"). 
The first and second sentences of the Arbitration Clause can both be given effect and 
harmonized. The first sentence, "[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall 
be arbitrated," manifests an unambiguous intention to arbitrate disputes. The second sentence, 
"[i]f agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process, 
Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void," sets forth the 
remedy to be ordered by the arbitrators if an agreement is not reached within 60 days after 
arbitration begins. 
This is the only reasonable construction of the Arbitration Clause. It gives meaning 
to the second sentence without negating the clear intent of the first sentence. It also comports 
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with the Utah Arbitration Act, which authorizes parties to impose a time period within which 
an arbitration award must be made. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-10 ("An arbitration award 
shall be made within the time set by the agreement"). Moreover, it represents a proper 
exercise of the parties' right to agree to a specific dispute resolution process, and to define the 
scope of the arbitrators' authority. See, e.g.. City and County of Denver v. District Court, 939 
P.2d 1353, 1361 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) ("The right of parties to contract encompasses the 
correlative power to agree to a specific ADR [Alternative Dispute Resolution] procedure for 
resolving disputes"); In re Clawson, 783 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Hawaii 1989) ("The scope of an 
arbitrator's authority is determined by agreement of the parties."); Board of Education v. 
Ewig, 609 P.2d 10,12 (Alaska 1980) ("In the absence of statutory restrictions, parties are free 
to contract for the terms of arbitration they desire."). 
Given the time-sensitive nature of the development of the Property, it made sense for 
the parties to agree to such a dispute resolution process, one that was confined in duration, 
avoided litigation, and provided a default remedy restoring the parties to the status quo ante 
if agreement could not be reached. Under the Arbitration Clause, inasmuch as the parties 
retain the ultimate discretion to reach an agreement, the arbitrators act as decision-makers on 
all other matters pursuant to the powers conferred upon them by the Utah Arbitration Act and 
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. For instance, they may "administer oaths 
and issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, records, 
documents, and other evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-8(l) (1999). They may also order 
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"a party to provide [the] other party with information which is determined by the arbitrator 
to be relevant/' or require "discovery as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [and 
determine the response time to the discovery requests]." Id. § 78-3 la-8(2); see also Rules R-
23, R-32 and R-33 of the American Arbitration Association (R. at 603-05). If agreement is 
not reached within 60 days of good-faith efforts,2 the arbitrators must order PWA to return 
CFI's earnest money deposit, and declare the Purchase Contract null and void.3 
This arbitration process is the remedy which the parties negotiated, and the Purchase 
Contract requires that this remedy be enforced. The Purchase Contract states: "Where a 
Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall 
be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law." 
(See Purchase Contract Tf 16; R. at 28). Because this provision is not in conflict with or 
superseded by any provision in the Contract Addendum, it controls, and it operates to give full 
force and effect to the terms of the Arbitration Clause. The parties' contractual remedy 
should be enforced, especially when CFFs only remaining claims against PWA are for alleged 
breaches of the terms of the Purchase Contract itself. 
If a disagreement between the parties had arisen during the period in which the 
Purchase Contract obligations were supposed to be performed, from June 14, 1998, 
to December 31, 1998, there potentially, but not necessarily, would have been an 
increased incentive for the parties to reach an agreement in the arbitration process. 
One may argue that this arbitration process resembles binding mediation. Regardless 
of the label given, it is clear that the parties intended to bind themselves to a method 
of alternative dispute resolution that resolved disagreements out of court, in a short 
period of time, with the default remedy to apply absent an agreement. 
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Notably, at the time the Arbitration Clause was executed, any number of events could 
have occurred to give rise to a dispute under the Purchase Contract. The agreed-upon 
arbitration process and default remedy could have worked to the advantage or disadvantage 
of either party. As it turns out, under the events that transpired, CFI now seeks to avoid this 
arbitration process entirely. CFI, however, should not be allowed to escape its bargain. It was 
improper for the trial court to alter or amend the agreement which the parties made for 
themselves.4 See Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co. Inc., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) 
(explaining, based on freedom of contract principles, that unambiguous contracts should be 
enforced as written). 
C. The First Sentence of the Arbitration Clause is Controlling, Even If It is 
Not Harmonized With the Second Sentence. 
To the extent the first and second sentences of the Arbitration Clause are in conflict 
and cannot be harmonized, the first sentence should be given greater weight. Its meaning is 
clear. In addition, as a general principle of contract interpretation, specific terms are given 
greater weight than general language. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 2d § 203 (c) 
(1979) ("specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language"). The 
first sentence uses the term "arbitration," which has specific and independent legal 
significance. See Reed v. Davis County School Dist., 892 P.2d at 1065 (holding arbitration 
4
 Alternatively, the trial court could have ordered the parties to commence arbitration 
pursuant to the first sentence of the Arbitration Clause, and let the arbitrators 
determine the meaning and/or enforceability of the second sentence. After all, the 
first sentence of the Arbitration Clause calls for disputes over the terms of the 
agreement to be arbitrated. 
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agreement did not exist because words "arbitration" or "arbitrate" did not appear). Thus, the 
parties's use of the term in the Arbitration Clause carries persuasive weight, especially in 
context of the mandatory nature of the phrase "[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this 
agreement shall be arbitrated." See Scher v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 723 F.Supp. 211,216 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (compelling arbitration by giving greater weight to first sentence of 
arbitration clause, which stated that controversies "shall be settled by arbitration," as opposed 
to second sentence of clause, which could have been construed to permit litigation). The trial 
court erred by construing the second sentence of the Arbitration Clause to defeat the plain 
meaning of the first sentence. 
In short, the parties' intent to arbitrate is evidenced by (i) the plain language of the 
Arbitration Clause, (ii) the parties' replacement of the standard dispute resolution clause with 
the Arbitration Clause, and (iii) the affidavits submitted to the trial court in connection with 
the Motion to Compel Arbitration. By denying PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration, the 
trial court failed to give effect to the parties' intentions, failed to harmonize both sentences 
of the Arbitration Clause, and violated other fundamental principles of contract interpretation. 
II PWA DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION. 
CFI's principal argument in response to PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration was that 
PWA had waived its right to seek arbitration under the standards set forth in Chandler v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992). Although the trial court did not deny 
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PWA's Motion to Compel Arbitration on that basis, (see R. at 762-63, Addendum "G" 
hereto), CFI may nevertheless attempt to make that argument again before this Court.5 
In Chandler, the Court established the two-pronged standard for determining whether 
a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration: "[W]aiver . . . must be based on both [i] 
a finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and 
[ii] a finding of prejudice." 833 P.2d at 360. Neither prong is satisfied in this case. 
First, as set forth in the "Statement of Facts" above, PWA did not participate in 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. CFI filed this action on November 
9, 1999. CFI recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens against the Property on the same date. Three 
days later, PWA notified CFI by letter that filing this action violated the Arbitration Clause. 
(See R. at 17-19). PWA requested that CFI immediately dismiss its Complaint and release 
the Notice of Lis Pendens. (See id.). When CFI refused to do so, PWA was forced to protect 
its legal interests by simultaneously filing (i) a Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title, requesting 
an order dismissing the claims against PWA and ordering the release of the Notice of Lis 
Pendens, and (ii) an Answer and Counterclaim. (See R. at 34-115). 
Given the time-sensitive nature of the development of PWA's property and The 
Canyons SPA, PWA had to resort to a court of law to obtain an order requiring the release of 
5
 The standard of review for whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate is different 
from the standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. As 
explained in Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^|16, 982 P.2d 572, the actions or 
events allegedly supporting waiver are reviewed as factual determinations, for which 
a trial court is accorded deference. Thus, to the extent CFI argues that PWA waived 
its right to arbitrate, CFI must overcome a higher standard of review. 
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the Notice of Lis Pendens, which threatened to hold up the development of the entire Canyons 
SPA. Furthermore, both the Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title and the Answer and 
Counterclaim specifically referred to the Arbitration Clause. The Motion to Dismiss and 
Quiet Title asserted that "in the event this court denies PWA's Motion to Dismiss, at the very 
least, the Court should enter an order compelling the parties to submit the matter to arbitration 
in accordance with [Addendum No. 1 requiring arbitration]." (See R. at 102, Addendum "E" 
hereto). The Answer and Counterclaim quoted the Arbitration Clause verbatim and 
referenced the letter of November 12, 1999, stating that initiating this action was not 
permitted under the Arbitration Clause. (See R. at 40-41, 47; Addendum "D" hereto). 
The trial court granted PWA's Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title on January 14,2000, 
which ruling was later reduced to a formal Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Quiet 
Title, entered February 28, 2000. Although that Order required CFI to release the Notice of 
Lis Pendens, it did not dismiss all of CFI's claims. Accordingly, only nine (9) days later, on 
March 9, 2000, PWA formally moved the trial court to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
Arbitration Clause. (See R. at 483-98). These facts show that PWA has not participated in 
this action in a manner inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. 
In addition, CFI cannot demonstrate that it has been unduly prejudiced by PWA's 
participation in this litigation. As explained in Chandler, "the prejudice must result from the 
delay in the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not from factors that are inherent in arbitration 
itself." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359. Inasmuch as there was no delay in PWA's assertion of the 
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right to arbitrate, there can be no prejudice resulting from a delay. Furthermore, PWA has not 
obtained any advantages in this litigation that could be unfairly used against CFI in the 
arbitration. There is simply no basis for a finding of prejudice. PWA therefore did not waive 
its right to arbitrate this dispute in accordance with the Arbitration Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
The Arbitration Clause reflects the parties' clear intent to avoid litigation, at all costs, 
to minimize any disruption to, or delay in, the development of the Property. The trial court's 
decision failed to give effect to the parties' intention. PWA therefore requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's denial of the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and remand with 
instructions that an order compelling arbitration be entered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J&%y of November, 2000. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
Mark R. Gaylord ' 
Craig H. Howe 
Attorneys for Park West Associates 
and Beaver Creek Associates 
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>l differences between the approxjmaie balance of the loan shown above and the actual balance it Codas shall then be adjusted tn 
**^yf\' Q«ah Oocher Il/a 
n Prom new insQlutionaJ nnancinf on ccuna no leai favorable to the Buyer than the following n / a (interesi rate for Hat 
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rTL£ TO PROPERTY A*ND TTTLR INSURANCE, (l) Seller His, Of shall have at Casing, free title 'o the Property and agrees to convey
 ?uCS M!C !O 
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\ Seller*! oon^»uons under subsections (a) tnd (b) Unless otherwise agreed under Section 14 the cornrmrmem shall confern wuh the mjc imunrui 
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K3t cf 3 surusrd 
ncr*s policy, shall be paid tor by the LJ Buyer £J Seller Al.»o, the cose oi 1 full-coverage ALTA survey, snail be paid "or by ihe 
FEQFIC UNDERTAKINGS 0 ? SELLER AND 8UY£!L 
7 1 SELLER DISCLOSURES. The Sailer will deliver to (he Buyer the following Seller Dtacieiures no raicr than the number of calendar days indicated be law 
ct shall be days after Acceptance: (days) 
H (a) a aV/«*» Property Conditio* Disclosure for the Property, signed end dated by Seller- m 2J1 
M (b) s corvmt merit, for die policy of title insurance required andc* Section 6 Co be issued by the title insurance company cwosen by Sc'le* ^n 
irc'ud.ng copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment. 
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through flf 1 • . ce*r(icd oy the Seller or by an independent auditor 
S (f) tenant Estoppel agreements. |?0 
Her agrees to pay any charge for cancellation of the udc commitment provided under subsection (b). 
If Sciler Joes not provide any of (he Seller Dliclosures wiihm the time periods i%rxcd above, the Buyer may either w»tvc the particular Seller Disclosure 
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7.2 DUYXTl QNDERTAKINCS. The Buyer agrees to I U 
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the Total Purchase PHee are available, _ _ _ 
"hese Bayer UndertakJags are it the sole expense of the Buyer and are material elemental of this Cantract for the benefit of both ihe Buyer and ihe Seller. 
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lisposai. The holder of the Carvcse Mooay Dttmlt shalL upon receipt of a copy of Seller4* written notice, deirver to the Seller the Earnest Money Deposit without 
he requirement of rurthcr written wthoreution from the Buyer. 
7J ADDITIONAL DUZ 0(LIC£NC£. The Buyer shad undertake the loilowmg Addicianai One Diligence elemcna •( iu own expense and for its awn 
benefit for the parpoco of complying with the Canungcncies under S*ctza* i: 
M (z) Ordering and oboinmg m appraisal of ihe Property if one is not othcrwite required under Stcilon IX 
S (b) Crdcrmg and obrauning t survey of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 6: 
B (c) Ordering and obtaining eny efrvrnaorncntairy related study of the PTuperty; 
B ( d ) Ordering and obtatnmg a phyaicai tnspeeuVan report regarding, and compicting a pertonei mspecnon e< tha rroparty; 
B ( c ) Requesting and obtaining voruacatJon (hat the fro perry axnpliea with ait appitcafahi federaL state, and local laws, ordinances, and refutations 'viih 
reprd to zoning and pcrrmssibie use of the Proporry. 
Seller agrees ua cooperate fully with Buyer's eompkung (hese Due DUlgeace maaers and to make the Property available as msonaole and necessary for the 
V CONTINGENCIES. This otfer ti subject to the Buyer's approving m its sole discretion the Seller DUciosvres, the Bayer Undertakings, tnd Additional Du* 
Diligence masers in Stetion 7 However, tha Buyer's discretion in approvwg the (erms a( the loan under subsection 7J (b) is suojee: to Buyer's covenant 
with regard ua fr*'mmaily accepuble (jnamaog terms under Section 2. 
$.\ Buyer shalt have I S calendar days after ihe times specified in Section 7.1 tod 72 for receipt of Seller Disclosures tnd for completion 01 
t»i Estatp *Wrr»iaa<yrontract « 
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f92^ASrS?9^^pei. 47C0. Fnsco. CO 80443. Version S 5 ©RaalFAlT© 1994: R*«* fVrUAR225436 
^nvjtetad Dy - ©Vent A, Fwm, Prtncpa4 SVoaer Ooer Croat Really 
0«/lW8 01 t7« PSgo2a.4 
r Undertakings ia review the cement of the disclosures and the outcome of the undertakings. The iatesi ... ^.icabie daic under Section 7.1 and 7.J applies 
ompletmg i review of Addlt?eaal DK« Diligence matters under Section 7. J. 
.1 (f Buyer does nor deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Diicloiare, Buyer Undertaking, ex- Due Diligence matter within the lime proved 
tenon S.I. that item will be deemed approved by Buyer. 
J If Buyer objects. Buyer and Seller shall have . 1 £ calendar day* after receipt of the objections to resolve Buyer's objections. Seller may. but shall noi 
squired to. resolve Buyer's objection!. likewise, (he Buyer is under no obligation to accept any resolution proposed by uSe Seller. If Buyer's objections are not 
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out shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyers written nonce, return to Buyer the Earnest Moaer Dcpoiit without the requirement of any funhcr written 
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.1 sallar to provida buyar with all enginaariag data regarding tha Property at 
llara axpan-a<*. 
9.2 S a l l a r to provida Buyar with Xastar Plan and i n i t i a l bu i ld ing des ign , with input 
om buyar , for tha Proparty ,at aal lara axpanaa, . 
9.3 B a l l a r to provida Buyar with a l l nacaaa&ry govammantal approvals rawarding y***~~*P4Pr{ 
oparty i n c l u d i n g Haatar Plan approval, at s a l l a r s axnenaa- ^A< C<^r*)\S**> fct^^ 4 ^ ^ " 
9.4 A "paopla movar* that ia accaptabla to buyar y ^ h i l Y ^ e daaignadPoad I n a t a l l a d to 
;a / a n t a r of tha property , a t no axpanaa to tha buyar, on or bafora 12 /1 /9 8. 
9f;5^^all«r aha-11 guaran*4ia that £1A. 000 l a ^ : . w i l l >fia\ approM*** for davelpMiaprtNon 
Uyvropa^ty^/Buy^r, a a / i t A a o l a ^ a e ^ r a t i o y T ha* t h a / a h i M t y y i o li^a^TaasciniiuL^f 
1,000 aovTSr. of t 3 a ^ 6 t a l Si^JWO a q > f ^ / a a coaiaiaa/cial ep«*e?a. 
9 .6 Buy or l a reaponaihla for a l l of tha watar aharaa and/or connaction-s, on tha aasna 
la ia aa tha a a l l a r and athor davalopare involved wi th in tha Canyoua Haatar Plan. 
9.7 S a l l a r a h d l l apply for , with input from buyar, and obtain Final Kaatar Plan *>xT\^f 
pproval, a t a a l l a r a mx?****. on or bafora J u l / 1, 1JJB. rvtygk* ?>t
 x &TZ Q~fZ- - / gjtfJ 
9.8 This t r a a a a c t i o u aha l l c loaa on tha a a r l i a r of 12/31/93 or IS days a f t a x ^ n a l 
aater- Pl*n approval . (j 
9.9 S a t i r a agraamant i a aubjact to Summit County Approval of danaity , zoning and 
ea . 
he terms of attached Addendum 3 _ _ L ire incorporated into this Canrract by this reference. 
5. S E I X K ' S LIMITED WAJUCOTTIES. Zdltfi wnmnuea to Buyer regarding the Property are limited GO uSe following: 
10.2 When Seller delivers possescioa of the Property to Buyer, K will be broom-dtao tnd free of debni and personal belongings: 
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with Che phmfcifl*, plumbed futures, heating, cooiing. ventilating electrical and sprinkler (indoor 
ml outdoor) ryrprms, appliances, and HrcpUces in working order; 
10J Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Bayer with (he roof tnd foundation (rem of leaks known to Seller: 
10.4 Seller will deliver possession of the Prvperqr «o Buyer with any privue well or acpuc tank serving the Property in working order nod in compliance *ith 
;ovemmenul regulao'ons; 
10J Selicr wiJI be responsible for lepaoing any of Seller's moving-relited damage to ihe Property; 
t0.6 A( Cosing, Sdler will bring currtm all fuianciel obligau'ooi encumbering the Property whieh are assumed m writing by Buyer and will discharge ill such 
jbltgauona which Buyer has noc so assamad; 
10.7 As of Oosiag. Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of aa environmentai. bvilding. or zoning code violation regarding the Property wltich lias 
w been resolved. 
II. VERIFICATION OF WARRA«VTED A/^O uNCLlfDfD ITEMS Ailer all eontlngcnces have been removed and before doting the Cuyer may conduct 
I "walk-through" inspection of the Property ks determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1. 10Li. 10.3 and 10.4 are in the warranted 
condition 2nd to verify that items included in Section / . / are presaatiy on the Property. If any item Is no* in die warranted condition, Seller will corract, repair 
or replace it as neaaasary or, with tha consent of Buyer and (if required) Lender, escrow a* wnoun* tt Gosiag M provide for such repair or replacement. The 
Flayer's failure to conduct a Nmlk-oVough* iaapeetian or » claim during the Sraik-through* inspection thai the Property does noc include all items referenced 
in &crfo« / . / or \M not m the condition warranted ia SrcfVo* 10, shad conslitUM a waiver of Buyer's righli under Section / . / a n d of the warranties conuincd in 
Section 10. 
I I CltANCZS OCJRING TSKAKSACT70N. Seller a^tea thai no changes in any existing leases thal\ be made, oo new leases entered into, and oo substantial 
alterations or (tnprqvejncnu us tha Prtoarry ihai) be underuicen without the written consent of the Buyer. 
13. AimiORTTY OF SIGNERS, (f Buyer or Seller ia a corporation, partnership, mast, estate, or other entity, the person signing this Contract on its behalf war. 
rants Ms or >Ser authority Go ao so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs or successors in taierot to Buyer or Seller. If the Seller is noi cne vested Owner of the 
Property but has control over the vested Owners disposition of the Property, the Setter io*ea la exercise this contra! and deliver tide under this Caozraet as h' 
ti had been signed by the vested Owner. 
14. COMPLETE COrTntACT. This iiuortirnent (termer with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller DUdarurta ) consdiuies the enure Contrsct 
tea! Estate Purchase Contract 
luverfal fffjQj Sctert::) J s £ — 
taa^AjTSwrnaTBoa: 47QQ, Fnaca. CO 8044X Varslon 5.5. CHeaiFArra), 19M: f^o* PUTUAR225425 
:omc<aiec ay - oVent A Femn% Pnnc«oa4 Brokar, Caer Qeal Realty 
06712/98 03:17:49 P a n o ^ c M 
«n -he p3n,a « , s u r g e s * p n - * - . » * — n *- P - c , Tnu C « r « . - n o t be < ™ ^ f f ^ ^ d„p()S„um £ lhe ^ 
MrVTZ RBOLtmON. Tne p « - . « « - « r « • * « - « * « <*•"*.« *« ^ ^ ' Z ^ Z I h *c Uuh ^
 C:„e D ^ S * . 
,. oe^ , - - »~* -—°<- «*c—-;- ^  * ~ : r r ; y ^ ^ ^ — *- *«. ,**, 
a u< nr* the American ArtitratKXi Auocuiton. Eicn p«ny agrccj to bear its o*m com 01 ^ a ; u * ^ 
a
" ° " o f - n i l J T b . b ^ If — M , :he ^ o . » and « « ™UW. ur,CT :W, Corset - > * P » » - - • - *» 
" " C X I » « « from L ™ , ^ c , - r f l—cc by to. S I * by r.Hn, . con,,, , , , «„n * , court. , « « . ,
 rt * *« " * * • » « . -
^ , n , ,u. -3 r w l 3j„i p«dinS rreduiion. AIM -.He pam« may .pes in «nung ta wtuvc med.suon. 
^ 1 t t I™ y c r ^ u - L S-Ur n*y dec: := «,*«, ,u,n , e tsrne* Money D ^ t - . * * » « - — I - or , « « *e £ « « M - v 0 * * , 
a
 r n enfor« Seller, ngha 1/ Seller ctefo-itt. in *M.uon <o reum of ft. E*r,c* M,«y D*p..«. Buyer tray dec: <o ««h« Kiept Com Seller « 
^ ,K„ -h, m-rrtiY shall b= ac'uiive renrdleu of nfris which might otherwise be iviilrtle urder common l»w. 
t ™ ? E ^ S a in « , Kuan ^ o g « of U» C - « « . che P—Hin, ? a ^ M b. cu.led m « » 3na - « « * ~ » J « « ; 
- » « « .ETec-ren. of a» (wria. including >n .g^emen. u«J« S«sii IS if U) does no. ippir. or fe> «=«" " ^ 
• S ^ o T ^ p . for m « « - « n - - M C - « - proton,
 rf Uu. C*.™. ^ » no. ^ r ^ r O - u * 
RISK OF LOSS. All ri* of ' « . or d ^ g e » <h. F™P«r«y ,h,« be borne by Seller «nl Cri-fr 
T^4F IS OF THE ESSENCX Time is of .he euencs rr^rding lhe datei «t fon.1 .n ihi* iwiaefoo. E*te««»« must be igrew s P 
r ™ IdeV - S ^ « of UW, C..,r..c • « « • ^ftr-ee. . da. .Ml be re,uired .bsoluuly by 5:00 P-M. « - « ^ ' « *• » « « ^ . 
Z T l ^ ^ Z - docunJ w , l s,l o ^ n be,r,„s o H ^ i * * « A * , te^le — - of . y S1Sned onFnal * « - c - »• 
™
 rtr nnv titmed facsiimle tnnsmusion iteil be chc iwne u delivery oC an on '^nal. 
• AM *2PM Mouncmm Time, W*jng i 3 , 1^7g ^ ^ 
lil return it to the 3uycr. 
o/4r 
-j— • - *"— - / — ' — 
By: D a v i d 3 i « g « i 
ACCSPTAKCS^REJECnON/COUNTlsROFFEa 
>^cn<.acc «f OtT^ r f IMrdMM: Stltar Acapli the for^ng oHcr on thc trim *nd conditions specified .bevc. 
a t A a d o c i a t e a *nd B a t v a r f-Z*^*Mt°^Lxtm* Par5cw« 
By, N*itar Plua %ji fkytr-- <$^~ ^ST 
0AT2 TIMS 
3RejectIwSellcrlUj«ct« tha foregoinf oftbr. 
f:r. j t i =rz^Si~. * -*- - ».tS- - —— •—»- "-1" Haunter OtTenScto presend Cor Buyers A«*p**ne* tlw lemtt 
Caudi«r Offer* ^ ^ 
ill Escact Purc.Use Contract 
. r fAfTB f o r « 8Q« 4T0O. Fr«eo. CO «<M41 V«*cn I S . « * - F A l T « . IBM: fUo« PUTUAR22S436 
no?« 
e Deer Crest Realty P.O. Box 3268 1375 Deer Valley Drive, Suite 210 _ 
H.TCR« Park City, Utah 84060 S S ? 
Phone: (435) 655-0555, Fax: (435) 645-9483 
~$d 
{y 
ADDENDUM NO. i_ 
TO 
^ REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
iS IS AM EL ADDENDUM U COUNTEROFFER to mat REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CCKTR\CT ((he "REPC*} wfCi an Offer Reference 
la of JUPQ,yTU—H2A , Including atf prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
C e n t r a l F l o r i d a I n v e s t m e n t s , l a c . 
8uyer, and 
Par3cw«at A a a o c i a t a a and B e a v e r Creak A s s o c i a t e d 
Sailer, regarding me Property located at 
. 'os tvood P a r c e l * l o c a t e d a t t h e baaa o f "The Canyona - s k i a r a a . 
te following lorma are haraby incorporated as part 0/ !he REPC: 
\ ^ ~ ^ 
This offer supercedes tha Raal Bstate Purchase Contract dated April 22, 1998. 
Buyer shall purchase approximately 20 ecraa aa prepared by Seller's Architect in 
Exhibit •A", attached hereto and made a past thereof. 
. Tha Proparty shall ba conveyed by Opd^II i^CTrranty Un^d, 
. Seller aha.ll provide Standard Owners Policy at Seller'a expense. 
.. Sailer shall provida a copy of tha survey prepared by Bush a Cuedgell. 
i. Buyer sha.ll submit Buyer4a plan to Summit Cotmty simuitaneoualy with Sailer1 a 
submittal. Tha plan shall Include architecture for a 400 unit tinaahaxe projact. 
' . The dealcm,yx^j»pcation of tha "People Hover* zmiat be acceptable to the Canyona 
Resort/^iw iaicil iatioa tad coat to be approved by. Seller. 
J, Buyer understand* and acreea to tha following] 
.-a) Summit County has atated that i t s preferred development is timeshare, interval 
/ / ownership, or hotel/motel. 
b) Seller, on i t s Master Plan, has an additional 257 unite of who la ownership 
' including €2 residential lot*, which a hall remain such after Buyer's County 
approvals are received. 
j^ rmw^  f rvmnfcy^ ttad the Canyons^  hava^ indicated an overall square foot parameter 
of approximately -aSO, 000 te g S&, ftSO square feet. 
y/ d> It nay be neceaaary to obtain frost Summit County a waiver for tha additional 
jj square footage in the timeehara portion neceasary for Buyers required unite. rs £- **P$3 
a) If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this contract may be *^~yt &^ 
cancelled in writing by either Buyer or fel ler. £vt*A &<Lt^*\v^^ 
9. This tranaaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days aftery approval^ of Buyer's 
tijaeshare project or December 31, 1599, ' ' 
10. The release prise of either aquare footage or acreage ehall be at 120% of par. 
All acres shall he released by the Seller only, on a release schedule approved by 
the Seller. 
11. Sailer shall "stub41 roads to tinaahaxe property oa three sides, which are north* 
south, and eaat, at Seller'a expenae. Buyer shall construct a l l interior roads to 
serve timaahare project at Buyer's mxp+as** 
12. Any disagreement over the terras of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties 
agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 50 
days from the beginning of an arbitration procesa Buyer shall receive i t s money 
bacic and this agreement shall be null and void. 
13. Seller shall be responsible for all coata aasociatad with the people mover l i f t . 
14. There shall be no interest on the unpaid balance owed to Seller. 
rHIS FORM APPROVED 8YTHE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMIttSStOM AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GEKERAU EFFECTIVE JUNE 12.199S. IT ^ 
REPLACES AHO SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM, XJ"^ 
^ddeadum » Real Estate Purcftaee Contract t 
ReaiFATlWorfro. 8ox 4700. F f t o . CO 80444, Venion 15 , ORaaiFAJTS). 199S: Reg* PUTUAA225436 
Cattiotoeo &y - Sre<i< A. Fernn. Prwooai Soaker. Deer On« Reatty
 Q | n 
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The tnnaaction shall constitute 5 aeparata cloainga asaociatad with each release 
far purposes of allowing the Seller 5 aeparata 1031 tax deferred exchanges. Each 
closing Jhe.ll be paid in caah with en additional 20H b«ing peid as a down payment 
for tha GAJCC echedulad cloaing. See belowt 
$2,450,000 Due at cloaing 
$500,000 
$2,550,000 Release 122,000 sq.ft. 
/ Prepayment 
/ lat Payment 






\ 4fch Payment 
Year 'f jflayent 
92,500,000 Due on lat yr anniversary 
$500,000 
$3,000,000 Release 122,000 aq.ft. 
$2,500,000 Due on 2nd yr anniversary 
$500,000 
$3,000,000 Solaaee 122,000 sq.ft. 
j 
$2,500,000 Due on 3rd yr anniversary 
$500,000 
$3,000,000 Release 122,000 sq.ft. 
ro *? p?y—^** \ ' $3,000,000 du« on 4th yr anniversary 
Release 122,000 eq-ftA^ r-eik<2£S* • , . 
me extent ihe terms of this ADOENOUM modify or conflict *rfth any provrs/ona of the REPC. Including ail prior addenda and counteroffers, ihcse 
ms srtart control. All o<her terms of the REPC. tacfudJngpncr addenda and counteroffers, not modified by mis ADDENDUM rtatf remain the same. 
Seller SJ Buyer snail have until 5 J U M O A J J . E3
 PJyL Mountain Time June IS . m f l to 3 0 ^ ^ tan^ ^ ^ 
JOENOUM in acccrdanca wi thy^^provb^a of Section 23 of THE REPC. Unless ao accepted, the offer as set forth In this AOOENOUM 
^ Buyer LJ Seller Signature Date Time L-J Buyer D Seller Signature Date Time 
a Seller U 
^ COUNTEROFFER: D 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECnON/COUNTER OFFER 
Setter U Bj^er hereby accsota the terms of (his ADOENOUM, 
Seder •-» Buyer presents aa a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached AOOENOUM NO. n/a
 # 
Signature) fl j it/ / / / >4 . - <0ato> 
3 REJECTION: C3 SeOer <-* Buyarmjects the ( 
(Signature) (Oate) fTime) 
ADDENDUM. 
Signature) (Oele) (Time) (Signature) (Oate) (Time) 
1$ FORM APPROVED 6Y THC UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GEHERAL, EFFECTIVE JUNE 12.1SSS. IT 
PLACES ANO SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
d**dum to (U*i Estate Purchase Cantrsct (V/V/ 
frt@ Setoffs) \\¥. ft?) 
atFAST€0^o?ms. Sox 4700, Frisco, CO 8Q443* Version 5.S. ORaa^AJT^, 199S: Rac,* PUTUAR225436 
mptetae dy«9mnt A. f^mn. Prrnoosd Bnsfcer. Oeer Cms* Raafty 
08/12*8 0*23:20 p*Qt2of: 
TabB 
Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
Craig H. Howe (#7552) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 1200 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2215 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001 
Counsel for Defendants, Park West Associates and 
Beaver Creek Associates 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC., ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and 
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER J. 
) PLUMB, III 
1 Civil No. 990600361CR 
) Judge Pat Brian 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Walter J. Plumb, III, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one (21) and have personal knowledge of the matters set 
forth herein. 
FITTLT 
DEC 1 3 1999 
^ Third patriot Court C X 
~u«puty Clerk. Summit Counfy ' 
2. I am a general partner of Park West Associates, a Utah general partnership 
(hereinafter referred to as TWA"). I am also the secretary of the Madison Company, a Utah 
corporation, which is the general partner of Beaver Creek Associates, a Utah limited partnership. 
I shall collectively refer to Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates as TWA." 
3. I have reviewed the Complaint filed in the above-referenced action and the lis 
pendens recorded in connection with the lawsuit, which has been recorded in violation of my 
understanding of that certain Real Estate Purchase Agreement, executed between PWA and Central 
Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI") on or about June 14,1998 (the "Purchase Contract"), a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference. 
4. Pursuant to the Purchase Contract, CFI offered to purchase a twenty-acre parcel 
within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons" (the "Property") for the purchase price of 
$ 15,000,000. At the time, the Frostwood Development consisted of approximately seventy-five (75) 
acres, which included the twenty-acre parcel subject to the Purchase Contract.1 Pursuant to the 
Purchase Contract, CFI was to purchase the Property by making a $50,000 earnest money deposit, 
paying $2,950,000 cash at the time of closing, and financing the balance of $12,500,000 over four 
(4) years. 
5. The Purchase Contract was a preprinted form used regularly by members of the Utah 
Association of Realtors, but was expressly "subject to" certain "Special Contingencies." I 
understood that closing had to occur "on the earlier of 12/31/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan 
approval," that the "[ejntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning 
The seventy-five acre parcel shall be referred to hereinafter as the "Frostwood Property." 
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and use," and that "time [was] of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction." In the 
event any one of these special contingencies did not occur, I understood the Purchase Contract would 
be terminated and PWA would no longer be obligated to sell the Property to CFI. 
6. Concurrent with the execution of the Purchase Contract, PWA also executed an 
addendum ("Addendum No. 1"), a copy of which is also attached as part of Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein by this reference. Addendum No. 1 amended and modified the Special 
Contingencies and further refined the conditions precedent to closing. In particular, it was my 
understanding that PWA would not be responsible for attempting to satisfy the contingency of 
obtaining Final Master Plan approval from Summit County. Instead it was agreed that the "Buyer 
shall submit Buyer's plan to Summit County simultaneously with Seller's submittal [for related 
development within the same area]." It was my understanding that the Buyer's plan would include 
architecture for a 400 unit timeshare project. In other words, CFI accepted full responsibility for 
satisfying the contingency of obtaining Summit County's approval of its timeshare project. It was 
further understood and agreed that the following additional terms contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 
of Addendum No.l modified the Purchase Contract: 
8.a) Summit County has stated that its preferred development is 
timeshare, interval ownership, or hotel/motel; 
b) Seller, on its Master Plan, has an additional 257 units of 
whole ownership including 63 residential lots, which shall remain 
such after Buyer's County approvals are received; 
c) Summit County and The Canyons have indicated an overall 
square foot parameter of approximately 957,000 square feet; 
d) It may be necessary to obtain from Summit County a waiver 
for the additional square footage in the timeshare portion necessary 
for Buyers required units; and 
e) If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this 
contract may be canceled in writing by either Buyer or Seller. 
UT_DOCS_A 1030376 v 1 3 
9. This transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after 
final approval by County of Buyer's timeshare project or 
December 31,1998. 
(Emphasis added.) In summary, it was my understanding that the Purchase Contract, as a condition 
to closing, required final Summit County approval of 400 timeshare units of approximately 1525 
square feet each or 610,000 total square feet, 257 whole ownership units consisting of 62 luxury 
single family homes with a contemplated average of 4,000 square feet and 195 multi-family units 
with an average of 2000 square feet for a total of 638,000 square feet. 
7. As a further condition of the Purchase Contract, the partners of PWA expressly 
negotiated a provision to avoid future litigation at all costs. In particular, Addendum No. 1 modified 
the Purchase Contract to provide that any disagreement over the its terms "shall be arbitrated by 
parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from 
the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall 
be null and void." The purpose of including this provision was to avoid the very litigation PWA 
finds itself involved in presently and because of the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics. Any 
delay would be crippling to the development of the Property. 
8. Finally, Addendum No. 1 expressly provided that "[t]o the extent the terms of this 
ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the [Purchase Contract], including all prior 
addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control/' 
9. In accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, on June 
25,1998, PWA delivered to CFI the following materials relating to the development of the Property: 
a. Surrounding Parcels/As Shown on Topo; 
UT_DOCSwA 1030376 v1 4 
b. Topo Survey; 
c. Documentation of Recent Impact Fees; 
d. Copy of SPA Agreement/Design Guidelines; and 
e. Owners Agreement. 
10. By September 2,1998, in addition to the foregoing items, PWA delivered to CFI the 
Master Utility Plan, Perimeter Survey, AGRA Report and Geotectonic Report, Alta Title's 
Preliminary Title Report and Seller's Property Disclosure. 
11. In October of 1998, PWA received a copy of a single-page sketch plan for CFI's 
twenty-acre proposed time share project from CFI; however, no architectural plans were ever 
submitted to me or anyone else associated with PWA. 
12. Because of CFI's failure to meet established deadlines, including its failure to submit 
a proposed development plan and architecture for 400 timeshare units, on November 12, 1998, 
Marian Crosby and Bill Coleman, on behalf of PWA, notified CFI that the Purchase Contract was 
no longer valid. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of the memorandum from Ms. Crosby and 
Mr. Coleman to CFI, dated November 12, 1998. 
13. In early December, 1998,1 attended a meeting between CFI and PWA. Those present 
included, among others, Richard E. Frost, Marion Crosby (via telephone), Steven Peterson, Brent 
Ferrin, Ron Ferrin, Jim Fogg, David Seigel and an attorney representing Mr. Seigel. During the 
meeting, it was expressly represented to CFI that the terms and conditions precedent contained in 
the Purchase Contract had not been met and could not be met by December 31,1998 and that if CFI 
wanted to avoid terminating the Purchase Contract, anew purchase contract and/or addendum would 
UT_DOCS_A 1030376 v 1 5 
need to be entered into between CFI and PWA before December 31,1998. However, no agreement 
was reached to either extend the Purchase Contract or revise its terms. 
14. On December 17, 1998, CFI wrote a letter to Dick Frost, as general partner of PWA, 
with a copy to me, to explain why it believed the Purchase Contract remained in full force and effect. 
A copy of the December 17, 1998 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." 
15. When December 31, 1998 came and went without Summit County's providing 
approval of PWA's plan's for the entire Frostwood Property and/or CFFs timeshare project, it was 
my understanding and the understanding of PWA that the Purchase Contract terminated and that 
PWA was free to deal with the Property as it saw was in its own best interest. 
16. In the early part of 1999, CFI attempted to reinstate the Purchase Contract by 
presenting several proposals to amend. At no time did I or anyone else working for or on behalf of 
PWA agree to reinstate the Purchase Contract. 
17. With the termination of the Purchase Contract, the other partners of PWA and I 
moved forward with efforts to participate in the amendment of a larger coordinated development 
being planned for the surrounding area of The Canyons Ski Resort. 
a. In late July of 1998, PWA had been approached by adjacent property owners 
about the possibility of expanding the boundaries of The Canyons Specially Planned Area Plan (the 
"First SPA Plan") adopted by Summit County on July 6, 1998 through the efforts of a group of 
property owners: namely, American Skiing Company Resort Properties, Inc., ASC Utah, Inc., Iron 
Mountain Associates, LLC, Wolf Mountain Resort, L,C, C&M Properties, and Groutage. 
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Negotiations over amendment of the First SPA Plan continued among the participants during the 
summer of 1999. 
b. After expressing an interest, I executed a "Non-binding Statement of 
Acknowledgment" on behalf of PWA whereby we committed to being included in a proposed 
amendment to the First SPA Plan. 
c. On several occasions, I spoke with representatives of CFI and informed them 
of PWA's participation in the efforts to amend the First SPA Plan. 
18. Beginning in the early part of 1999 and continuing throughout November, I 
participated extensively with the adjacent property owners to secure approval from Summit County 
of an amendment to the First SPA Plan. As part of that process, I participated in numerous meetings 
with Summit County to discuss the various proposals, including the County's demand that an 
18-hole golf course be included within the amended development plan. It became apparent that this 
was one of the central conditions for approval of any amendment to the First SPA Plan. 
19. Since January of this year alone, PWA has incurred expenses relating to obtaining 
approval of the amendment to the First SPA Plan in excess of $100,000. 
20. On November 15, 1999, the Summit County Board of Commissioners ratified and 
approved the amendment to the First SPA Plan (the "The Canyons SPA"). PWA had previously 
executed The Canyons SPA, on November 8, 1999, which contemplates the development of a 
master-planned resort community (the "Project") for The Canyons on over 7,000 acres of land in 
Summit County. The Canyons SPA allocated to the Frostwood Project and PWA 857,000 square 
feet, including approximately 40,000 square feet of commercial space. PWA was also obligated to 
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deed 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres to Summit County, further reducing the 
development entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. 
21. The approximately seventy-five acre Frostwood Property is located within the Project 
and, in particular, "The Canyons Resort Center." The Frostwood Property's periphery is to be used 
primarily for open space, including the majority of four holes to be constructed on the golf course. 
22. Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which is subject to 
strict deadlines, is one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the development 
of the Project. 
23. Under the terms of The Canyons SPA, the Project is to be phased in by expansion 
outward from the "Resort Core," which is adjacent to the Frostwood Property. For this reason, 
construction of the outer planning areas is conditioned upon progress in developing the Resort Core 
and its surrounding areas, including the Frostwood Property. 
24. Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which will be partially 
situated on Frostwood property, is one of the two highest priorities in the Project. Indeed, section 
3.2.6 of The Canyons SPA requires, in part, that the parties "ensure that the course is completed 
within 36 months" of November 15, 1999. Failure to meet this deadline could cause a revocation 
of all development entitlements of all participants of The Canyons SPA, including PWA. 
25. Because of the lis pendens recorded against the Frostwood property, the timely 
development and completion of the entire golf course has been placed in jeopardy. 
26. CFI's action is threatening the successful completion of The Canyons SPA 
development entirely, including the golf course, and the lis pendens will cause irreparable harm to 
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both PWA, as an owner of property subject to The Canyons SPA, and The Canyons SPA 
development itself if not released immediately. This is particularly so, considering the 2002 
Olympics are coming and, therefore, time is of the essence. 
27. As of today's date, CFI breached the Purchase Contract by failing, refusing and 
neglecting to dismiss the complaint or release the lis pendens. 
DATED this ? ^ day of December 1999. 
Walter J. Plumb, III 
STATE OF UTAH 




On this 6 day of December, 1999, before me, the undersigned notary, personally 
appeared WALTER J. PLUMB, III, who is personally known to me, or has provided satisfactory 
evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to this instrument, and who swore and affirmed 
to me that the signature is voluntary and the document truthful. 
My Commission Expires: 
> . 5 - £L<-3 
i f> M^JL,^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: <^u^ Z ^ A C ^ , u T r f X . 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
~£AN E. MCDONALD 
1420 South Lincoln St. 
S.L.C., UT 84105 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JULY 3,2003 
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LAWYERS@BALLARDSPAHR COM 
MARK R GAYLORD 
OIRECT DIAL 6 0 I - S 3 I 0 0 7 0 
GAYLORD^BALLAROSPAMR COM November 12, 1999 
Via Facsimile (801) 521-9015 
and Hand Delivery 
Central Florida Investments, Inc. 
c/o Wayne G. Petty 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Park West Associates / Frostwood Parcel 
Gentlemen: 
This firm represents Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates (collectively 
"PWA") in connection with the matters which follow. PWA and Central Florida Investments, 
Inc. ("CFI") entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract together with Addendum No. 1 thereto, 
each dated June 12, 1998 ("Purchase Contract"). The Purchase Contract is the subject of this 
letter. 
As you are aware, PWA has consistently taken the position that the Purchase Contract 
terminated on December 31, 1998, due to the fact that several special contingencies set forth in 
Section 9 of the Purchase Contract were not satisfied, including among other things, Summit 
County's failure to grant final approval of Buyer's timeshare project by December 31,1998. 
Furthermore, the entire Purchase Contract, under special contingency 9.9, was subject to Summit 
County's approval of density, zoning and use as described by the Purchase Contract This 
approval did not occur by the December 31,1998 drop dead date. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and reserving to PWA the rights under the termination 
provisions of the Purchase Contract described above, PWA hereby gives you written notice that 
the Purchase Contract is canceled by the Buyer in accordance with Addendum No. 1, Items 8C, 
D and E. Under Sections 8C and 8D of Addendum 1, CFI acknowledged that the Frostwood 
Project would require a base density of 959,000 square feet augmented by the additional square 
PHILADELPHIA, P A 
BALTIMORE. MO 
CAMOEN, NJ 
OENVER, C O 
WASHINGTON, DC 
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footage necessary for CFI's timeshare project. It was contemplated by the parties that 
approximately 1.2 million square feet of approved density would be required in order for CFI to 
achieve a 400 unit timeshare project (610,000 total square feet) and for PWA to achieve 62 
residential lots with an average square footage of approximately 4,000 square feet each (248,000 
total square feet) and an additional 195 units having approximately 2,000 square feet each 
(390,000 total square feet). 
As of November 8, 1999, the final Spa Agreement allocated to the Frostwood Project and 
PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents (excluding the property deeded to Summit 
County described below), of which approximately 40,000 is commercial. An additional 40,000 
square feet of approved density on four acres must be deeded by PWA to Summit County, 
further reducing the development entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. Clearly, the 
957,000 square feet required by the Purchase Contract was not achieved, let alone the additional 
square footage necessary to permit both a 400 unit timeshare project as well as PWA's additional 
257 units of whole ownership, including the 62 residential lots. 
Accordingly, subject to its reservation of all rights under the Purchase Contract, including 
the termination described above, PWA hereby cancels the Purchase Contract in accordance with 
Addendum No. 1, Section 8 E, due to Summit County's failure to grant the Frostwood Project 
the minimum square footage established as a condition to sale under the Purchase Contract 
Due to the termination of the Purchase Contract, the filing of the Complaint and 
recording of the lis pendens was improper. Paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1 expressly provides 
that "any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed 
upon by both Buyer and Seller." Paragraph 12 was included in the parties agreement for the 
express purpose of avoiding litigation. More importantly, this paragraph supercedes and replaces 
section 15 of the Purchase Agreement in that it conflicts with the rights of the parties to submit 
the matter to mediation. Since the terms of the Addendum modify and conflict with section 15 
the terms of Addendum No. 1 control. As such, the filing of the Complaint and recording of lis 
pendens constitutes a breach of the Purchase Contract. It is also a wrongful lien that is actionable 
under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1. 
Section 38-9-1(6) defines a "wrongful lien" as any document that purports to create a lien 
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property, and at the time it is recorded or 
filed is not expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute. Although Utah 
law provides an exception for lis pendens it only does so if the action is authorized. The action 
filed by CFI is not authorized by statute or the Purchase Contract In fact, it is expressly 
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prohibited by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1. Therefore, PWA respectfully requests that CFI 
immediately dismiss the complaint and release the lis pendens. See Utah Code Ann, § 38-9-4, 
Failure to do so may subject CFI to a claim for damages arising from, among other things, a 
wrongful lien having been placed on the property. 
Should you wish to discuss the contents of this letter, please do not hesitate to call. 
Very truly yours, 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
Mark R. Gaylord' 
cc: Walter J. Plumb, HI, Esq. 
Steven D. Peterson, Esq. 
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Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
Craig H. Howe (#7552) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 1200 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2215 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001 
Counsel for Defendants, Park West Associates and 
Beaver Creek Associates 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and 
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
INC., 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
> TO QUIET TITLE 
) Civil No. 990600361CR 
1 Judge Pat Brian 
Defendants, Park West Associates ("Park West") and Beaver Creek Associates ("Beaver 
Creek") (collectively "PWA"), by and through their counsel, hereby submit the following 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. For the reasons set forth below, 
PWA respectfully requests that this Court enter an order dismissing the action brought by plaintiff, 
Central Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), and canceling the notice of lis pendens recorded against 
the subject property, only a portion of which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
N 0 . _ _ 
FILED 
By. 
DEC 1 3 1999 
Third District Court 
Dtputy Clerk, Summit Com 
INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of Summit County's approval of one of the largest development projects to be 
undertaken within its jurisdiction, an expenenced and highly sophisticated Flonda corporation that 
specializes in timeshare resort developments filed this action seeking specific performance of a real 
estate purchase contract that terminated by its own terms over ele\ en months ago On July 14,1998, 
CFI offered to purchase a twenty-acre parcel within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons" 
for the purchase price of SI 5,000,000 The agreement contained several conditions precedent and 
provided that closing would occur "on the earlier of 12731/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan 
approval," that the "[ejntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning 
and use," and that time was of the essence Because Summit County never gave its approval and the 
transaction did not close by December 31,1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated by 
its own terms on that date Therefore, this Court should dismiss this action on the grounds that CFI 
cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
Concurrent with the filing of this action, CFI recorded a lis pendens against all seventy-five 
acres owned by PWA, even though the expired Purchase Contract only contemplated the purchase 
of twenty acres CFI relies upon section 15 of the Purchase Contract to justify the recording of the 
lis pendens CFI, however, ignores two essential facts First, the Purchase Contract terminated by 
its own terms Second, Section 15 was superseded by Addendum No 1, whereby the parties agreed 
to arbitrate any disagreement over the terms of the agreement without the threat of an action being • 
filed or lis pendens being recorded If arbitration were unsuccessful, the parties agreed that the 
Purchase Contract would be rendered null and void. 
Now, eleven months has passed since the termination of the Purchase Contract, and PWA 
has expended valuable time and resources working with other adjacent property owners to obtain 
Summit County approval of the development of over 7,000 acres within The Canyons Specially 
Planned Area ("The Canyons SPA"). In short, the recording of the lis pendens was made not to 
prevent conveyance of the property but rather to coerce PWA to settle regardless of the merits of 
CFI's claims. Therefore, this Court should dismiss this action and order that the lis pendens be 
released to allow the development of The Canyons SPA. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the following facts are 
submitted in support of PWA's Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. 
1. PWA is the owner of an approximately seventy-five (75) acre parcel of real property 
in Summit County near The Canyons Ski Resort, the legal description of which is contained in the 
Notice of Lis Pendens recorded in this action. (A copy of the Notice of Lis Pendens is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A.") PWA recently completed final plans for the development of this property, which is 
commonly referred to as the "Frostwood Development." 
2. Over a year and a half ago, on or about June 5, 1998, CFI, through its real estate 
agent, Brent Ferrin, presented to PWA a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Purchase Contract"), 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by this reference, whereby CFI 
offered to purchase a twenty-acre parcel within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons" (the 
"Property") for the purchase price of $ 15,000,000. {See Answer and Counterclaim of Park West Associates 
and Beaver Creek Associates (the "Counterclaim"), dated December 7,1999, ^ 9; Affidavit of Richard E. Frost, dated 
December 3, 1999 ("Frost Affidavit"), U 4; Affidavit of Walter J. Plumb, III, dated December 8, 1999 ("Plumb 
Affidavit"), U 4.) 
3. Pursuant to the Purchase Contract, CFI was to purchase the Property by making a 
550,000 earnest money deposit, paying 52,950,000 cash at the time of closing, and financing the 
balance of 512,500,000 over four (4) years. (Counterclaim,^  9; Purchase Contract, *2.) 
4. Although the Purchase Contract was a preprinted form used regularly by members 
of the Utah Association of Realtors, it was expressly "subject to" certain "Special Contingencies." 
(Purchase Contract, 1 9.) The Purchase Contract stated that closing would occur "on the earlier of 
12/31/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan approval," that the "[ejntire agreement [was] subject to 
Summit County Approval of density, zoning and use," and that "time [was] of the essence regarding 
the dates set forth in this transaction." (Purchase Contract, «!*[ 9.8, 9.9, and 21.) In the event any one of 
these special contingencies did not occur, the Purchase Contract would terminate automatically and 
PWA would no longer be obligated to sell the Property to CFI. (Frost Affidavit, % 5; Plumb Affidavit, H 5.) 
5. On or about June 8, 1999, PWA made a counter-proposal to CFI through an 
addendum to the Purchase Contract ("Addendum No. 1"), a copy of which is also attached as part 
of Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. (Counterclaim, K 11.) 
6. Pursuant to Addendum No. 1, the Purchase Contract was amended to modify the 
foregoing contingencies and to further refine the conditions precedent to closing. In particular, it 
was agreed that PWA would not be responsible for attempting to satisfy the contingency of obtaining 
Final Master Plan approval from Summit County. Instead it was agreed that "Buyer shall submit 
Buyer's plan to Summit County simultaneously with Seller's submittal [for related development 
within the same area]. The Plan shall include architecture for a 400 unit timeshare project." (See 
Addendum No. 1, K 6.) In other words, the Buyer accepted full responsibility for satisfying the 
contingency of obtaining Summit County approval of its timeshare project. (Id.) CFI, however, 
A 
never submitted architectural drawings for its timeshare project to PWA or Summit County. (Frost 
Affidavit,! 11.) 
7. In addition, PWA and CFI understood and agreed to the following additional terms 
contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Addendum No. 1: 
8.a) Summit County has stated that its preferred development is timeshare, 
interval ownership, or hotel/motel; 
8.b) Seller, on its Master Plan, has an additional 257 units of whole ownership 
including 63 residential lots, which shall remain such after Buyer's County approvals 
are received; 
8.c) Summit County and The Canyons have indicated an overall square foot 
parameter of approximately 957,000 square feet; 
8 .d) It may be necessary to obtain from Summit County a waiver for the additional 
square footage in the timeshare portion necessary for Buyers required units; and 
8.e) If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this contract may be 
canceled in writing by either Buyer or Seller. 
9. This transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after final approval by 
County of Buyer's timeshare project or December 31,1998. 
(Addendum No. l, «ffl 8 and 9 (emphasis added).) In summary, the Purchase Contract, as a condition to 
closing, required final Summit County approval of 400 timeshare units of approximately 1525 square 
feet each or 610,000 total square feet, 257 whole ownership units consisting of 62 luxury single 
family homes with a contemplated average of 4,000 square feet and 195 multifamily units with an 
average of 2000 square feet for a total of 638,000 square feet. (Id.) 
8. Addendum No. 1 further modified the Purchase Contract by providing that any 
disagreement over its terms "shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller. If 
agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall 
receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void." (Id. n 12.) PWA expressly 
demanded the inclusion of this provision for the purpose of avoiding any kind of litigation over the 
terms of the Purchase Contract because of the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics. (See Plumb 
^ 
Affidavit <I 7; Frost Affidavit, ^ 7.) 
9. Finally, Addendum No. 1 expressly provided that "[t]o the extent the terms of this 
ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the [Purchase Contract], including all prior 
addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control." (Addendum No. l, at 2.) 
10. On or about June 14, 1998, CFI and PWA executed the Purchase Contract and 
Addendum No. 1. (See Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1.) 
11. In accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, on June 
25,1998, PWA delivered to CFI the following materials relating to the development of the Property: 
a. Surrounding Parcels/As Shown on Topo; 
b. Topo Survey; 
c. Documentation of Recent Impact Fees; 
d. Copy of SPA Agreement/Design Guidelines; and 
e. Owners Agreement. 
CFI never responded to either PWA or the architects regarding PWA's designs. (See Frost Affidavit, 
119.) 
12. By September 2, 1998, in addition to the items identified above, PWA had delivered 
to CFI the Master Utility Plan, Perimeter Survey, AGRA Report and Geotectonic Report, Alta Title's 
Preliminary Title Report, and Seller's Property Disclosure. (Frost Affidavit^  10; Plumb Affidavit, ^10.) 
13. In October of 1998, PWA received a copy of a single-page sketch plan for CFI's 
twenty-acre proposed timeshare project from CFI; however, no architectural plans were ever 
submitted to PWA. (Frost Affidavit, f 11; Plumb Affidavit, II11.) 
14. Because of CFPs failure to meet established deadlines, including its failure to submit 
a proposed development plan and architecture for 400 timeshare units, on November 12, 1998, 
Marian Crosby and Bill Coleman, on behalf of PWA, notified CFI that the Purchase Contract was 
no longer valid. (Frost Affidavit, f 12, Plumb Affidavit, c 12.) 
15. In early December 1998, a meeting was held between CFI and PWA whereby it was 
expressly represented to CFI that the terms and conditions precedent contained in the Purchase 
Contract had not been met and could not be met by December 31, 1998 and that if CFI wanted to 
avoid terminating the Purchase Contract, a new purchase contract and/or addendum would need to 
be entered into between CFI and PWA before December 31,1998. (Frost Affidavit, «| 13, Plumb Affidavit, 
113.) 
16. On December 17, 1998, Mark Waltrip, Director of Real Estate and Development at 
CFI, wrote to Dick Frost, a general partner of PWA, explaining why he believed the Purchase 
Contract remained in full force and effect. (Frost Affidavit, H 14.) 
17. Notwithstanding CFFs written assertions, PWA understood that the Purchase Contract 
terminated by its own terms on December 31, 1998, when the parties failed to close the sale, a fact 
that Mr. Frost expressly stated to Mark Waltrip. {Id., U 15; see also Addendum No. 1, % 9 (purchase of the 
Property was subject to the transaction closing on the earlier of December 31, 1998 or 15 days after final Summit 
County approval).) Thus, when December 31,1998 came and went without Summit County's approval 
of CFI's timeshare project, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated. 
18. In the early part of 1999, CFI repeatedly attempted to reinstate the Purchase Contract 
by presenting several proposals to amend. At no time did PWA agree to reinstate the Purchase 
Contract. {Id., H 16; Plumb Affidavit, \ 16.) 
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19. On or about April 30, 1999, counsel for CFI wrote a letter to PWA, wherein he 
asserted that "the Purchase Contract is in full force and effect" and that his client "stands ready, 
willing and able to perform subject to compliance by [PWA] with its obligations thereunder." As 
part of the letter, counsel admitted that an amendment to the Purchase Contract "has not been 
executed" extending its terms. (See Michael E. Marder's letter, dated April 30,1999, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C") Significantly, the letter completely ignored and failed to address the special 
contingencies that were material to the Purchase Contract closing. (Id.; see Purchase Contract, H 9 and 
Addendum No. 1.) 
20. With the termination of the Purchase Contract, PWA moved forward with its efforts 
to participate in the amendment of a larger coordinated development of 7,000 acres being planned 
for the area surrounding The Canyons Ski Resort and amending The Canyons Specially Planned 
Area Plan ("First SPA Plan").1 
a. In late July of 1998, PWA had been approached by adjacent property owners 
about the possibility of expanding the boundaries of the First SPA Plan adopted by Summit County 
on July 6, 1998 through the efforts of a group of property owners: namely, American Skiing 
Company Resort Properties, Inc., ASC Utah, Inc., Iron Mountain Associates, LLC, Wolf Mountain 
Resort, L.C., C&M Properties, and Groutage. (Frost Affidavit,«] 17; Plumb Affidavit, U 17.) Negotiations 
over the amendment of the First SPA Plan continued among the participants during the summer of 
1999. (Frost Affidavit, 1| 17; Plumb Affidavit, U 17.) 
The property owners participating in amending the First SPA Plan are identified on Exhibit "D" attached 
hereto. 
b. After expressing an interest in participating, PWA executed a "Non-binding 
Statement of Acknowledgment" whereby it committed to being included in a proposed amendment 
to the First SPA Plan. (Frost Affidavit, «[ 17; Plumb Affidavit. c 17.) 
c. On several occasions, PWA representatives spoke with representatives of CFI 
and informed them of PWA's participation in the efforts to amend the First SPA Plan. (Frost Affidavit, 
«! 17; Plumb Affidavit, ^ 17.) 
21. Beginning in the early part of 1999 and continuing through November 1999, PWA 
representatives, particularly Mr. Frost, participated extensively with the adjacent property owners 
to secure approval from Summit County of an amendment to the First SPA Plan. As part of that 
process, PWA representatives participated in numerous meetings with Summit County to discuss 
the various proposals, including the County's demand that an 18-hole golf course be included within 
the amended development plan. (Frost Affidavit, n 18; Plumb Affidavit, H 18.) 
22. It also became evident that Summit County's approval was still far from certain. It 
was then decided that a committee would be formed from the thirty-one property owners involved 
in securing an amendment to the First SPA Plan to work toward securing approval from Summit 
County. Mr. Frost, of PWA, was asked to serve on this committee, along with Robert Sacks and 
Joseph Tesch and representatives of ASC, Inc. (including Ed Grampp, John Vehenian and Greg 
Speam). The committee was responsible for the development of the two major documents that were 
ultimately to govern the entire development, along with a budget for the same. It was also charged 
with the responsibility of preparing the Articles of Incorporation of The Canyons SPA Village 
Management Agreement and The Canyons Restated and Amended Development Agreement. Along 
with the foregoing work, the committee dealt with issues such as water, sewer, electricity and other 
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infrastructure. Over the course of approximately ten months (early 1999 through November 15, 
1999), Mr. Frost, on behalf of PWA, and the other participants expended approximately 300 hours 
of time working with the committee and Summit County on matters relating to obtaining approval 
for the amendment of the First SPA Plan. During this period of time, Mr. Frost participated in 
numerous meetings with Summit County to discuss the various proposals, including the County's 
demand that an 18-hole golf course be included within the amended development plan. It became 
apparent that this was one of the central conditions for approval of any amendment to the First SPA 
Plan. (Frost Affidavit, t 18.) 
23. Since January of this year alone, PWA has incurred expenses relating to obtaining 
approval of the amendment to the First SPA Plan in excess of $100,000. (Frost Affidavit, ^19; Plumb 
Affidavit H 19.) 
24. On November 15, 1999, the Summit County Board of Commissioners ratified and 
approved the Amended and Restated Development Agreement for The Canyons Specially Planned 
Area ("The Canyons SPA"), which had been executed previously by PWA on November 8,1999, 
and which contemplates the development of a master-planned resort community (the "Project") for 
The Canyons on over 7,000 acres of land in Summit County. (Frost Affidavit, H 20; Plumb Affidavit, 1(20.) 
The Canyons SPA allocated to the Frostwood Project and PWA 857,000 square feet, including 
approximately 40,000 square feet of commercial space. (Due to the size and length of The Canyons 
SPA, PWA will make a copy of it available to the Court at the hearing or upon its request.) PWA 
was also obligated to deed 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres to Summit County, 
further reducing the development entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. (Frost Affidavit,^; 
Plumb Affidavit, f 20.) 
UT_DOCS_A 1030464 v1 10 
25. The approximately seventy-five acre Frostwood Property is located within the Project 
and, in particular, "The Canyons Resort Center." The Frostwood Property's periphery7 is to be used 
primarily for open space, including the development of a portion of an eighteen-hole golf course. 
In fact, the Frostwood Property encompasses the majority of four holes to be constructed on the golf 
course. (Frost Affidavit. T 21; Plumb Affidavit, 1i 21.) 
26. Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which is subject to 
strict deadlines, is one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the development 
of the project. (See Frost Affidavit,«! 22; Plumb Affidavit,«I 22; Affidavit of Joe Tesch, % 7-9; Affidavit of Ray Klein 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title, 1) 7-9; Affidavit of Ron Ferrin in Support of Motion to Dismiss and 
to Quiet Title, f 7-9; Affidavit of Robert Fogg in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. *f 7-9; Affidavit of 
Everett N. Goodwin in Support of Motion of Dismiss and to Quiet Title, ^ 7-8; Affidavit of Annette Baker in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title, 1J 7-9; Affidavit of John B. Hewlett in support of Motion to Dismiss and to 
Quiet Title, f7-9 (PWA shall refer to the foregoing affidavits collectively as the "Participant Affidavits").) 
27. Under the terms of The Canyons SPA, the Project is to be phased in by expansion 
outward from the "Resort Core," which is adjacent to the Frostwood Property. For this reason, 
construction of the outer planning areas is conditioned upon progress in developing the Resort Core 
and its surrounding areas, including the Frostwood Property. (See Participant Affidavits.) 
28. Anticipating Summit County's ratification of The Canyons SPA, CFI commenced this 
action and recorded a lis pendens against all seventy-five acres in the Frostwood Property. (See 
Complaint, 1)4.) 
29. CFI's filing of this action and recording of lis pendens were made knowingly or 
having reason to know that the claims were groundless, since its filing of the complaint and 
recording of the lis pendens are not authorized by the Purchase Contract, which terminated by its 
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own terms on December 31,1998, and the lis pendens covers far more property than that which was 
subject to the Purchase Contract. In fact, the filing of this action and the recording of lis pendens 
are expressly barred by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1. 
30. On November 12,1999, counsel for PWA gave written notice reiterating to CFI that 
the Purchase Contract terminated on December 31, 1998. (See Letter from Mark R. Gaylord, dated 
November 12. 1999, attached hereto as Exhibit "E.") PWA's counsel went on to explain that: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and reserving to PWA the rights under the 
termination provisions of the Purchase Contract described above, PWA hereby gives 
you written notice that the Purchase Contract is canceled by the Buyer in accordance 
with Addendum No. 1, Items 8C, D and E. Under Sections 8C and 8D of Addendum 
1, CFI acknowledged that the Frostwood Project would require a base density of 
959,000 square feet augmented by the additional square footage necessary for CFFs 
timeshare project. It was contemplated by the parties that approximately 1.2 million 
square feet of approved density would be required in order for CFI to achieve a 400 
unit timeshare project (610,000 total square feet) and for PWA to achieve 62 
residential lots with an average square footage of approximately 4,000 square feet 
each (248,000 total square feet) and an additional 195 units having approximately 
2,000 square feet each (390,000 total square feet). 
As of November 8,1999, the final Spa Agreement allocated to the Frostwood 
Project and PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents (excluding the 
property deeded to Summit County described below), of which approximately 40,000 
is commercial. An additional 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres 
must be deeded by PWA to Summit County, further reducing the development 
entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. Clearly, the 957,000 square feet 
required by the Purchase Contract was not achieved, let alone the additional square 
footage necessary to permit both a 400 unit timeshare project as well as PWA's 
additional 257 units of whole ownership, including the 62 residential lots. 
Accordingly, subject to its reservation of all rights under the Purchase 
Contract, including the termination described above, PWA hereby cancels the 
Purchase Contract in accordance with Addendum No. 1, Section 8 E, due to Summit 
County's failure to grant the Frostwood Project the minimum square footage 
established as a condition to sale under the Purchase Contract. 
(See Exhibit "E," at pp. 1-2.) Finally, counsel went on to demand that CFI dismiss the complaint and 
release the lis pendens. 
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31. As of today's date, CFI has failed to comply with the Purchase Contract by dismissing 
the complaint or releasing the lis pendens. 
32. More importantly, CFI's action is seriously threatening the successful completion of 
The Canyons SPA development, including the golf course, which will cause irreparable harm to the 
other participants in The Canyons SPA development plan. (See Participant Affidavits.) 
33. In particular, The Canyons SPA grants the participants certain development 
entitlements to which properties within the Project are currently entitled. Any delay in the timely 
development and completion of, among other things, the golf course or the Project may cause the 
participants to lose the development entitlements, thereby causing irreparable damage because of 
the reduced economic and development potential of the entire Project. (See Participant Affidavits.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS ACTION AGAINST PWA BECAUSE THE 
PURCHASE CONTRACT AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED, ACCORDING TO 
ITS TERMS, ON DECEMBER 31,1998. 
According to the express terms of the Purchase Contract, the transaction at issue in this case 
was required to close no later than December 31,1998. The Purchase Contract further provided that 
M[t]ime is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction." (See Purchase Contract, U 21.) 
Because, as a matter of law, the Purchase Contract that CFI seeks to enforce automatically expired, 
according to its terms, on December 31,1998, this action is without merit and should be dismissed.2 
A motion to dismiss is appropriate "where it clearly appears that the plaintiffs would not be 
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to support their 
In addition, this lawsuit is prohibited by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1, which requires that all 
disagreements be submitted to arbitration and that if arbitration is unsuccessful, the Purchase Agreement is 
null and void. 
UT DOCS A 1030464 v1 13 
claim." Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Because the contents of the 
Purchase Contract are alleged in the complaint and the authenticity of the Purchase Contract is 
undisputed, this Court may properly consider the contents of the Purchase Contract on a motion to 
dismiss. See Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.l (9th Cir. 1994). Because PWA is 
submitting extrinsic materials in support of this Motion, however, to the extent this Court deems it 
necessary to rely on such materials, it may also properly treat this Motion as one for summary 
judgment. Certified Surety Group, Ltd. v. UTInc., 960 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah 1998). 
A review of the Purchase Contract leads to the inevitable conclusion that the contract expired 
on December 31, 1998, when the transaction failed to close. Where a contract makes time of the 
essence and sets a firm closing date, the contract terminates, according to its terms, when the 
transaction fails to close on the closing date. See Century 21 All Western Real Estate and 
Investment, Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 n.l (Utah 1982); Mid-Town Limited Partnership v. 
Preston, 848 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).3 In Preston, an action seeking specific 
performance of a real estate purchase contract, the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the case 
to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the complaint because the contract had expired by its 
terms when the parties failed to close by the closing date. Id. at 1272-73. (A true and correct copy of 
the Preston opinion is attached as Exhibit "F.") The court emphasized that "[t]ime was of the essence of the 
sale agreement," and that, upon the passing of the closing date, the "expiration [of the contract] was 
automatic." Id. at 1272. 
Alternatively, because Addendum No. 1 provides that its terms govern over any inconsistent terms 
contained in the Purchase Contract, the provisions in Addendum No. 1 requiring arbitration are controlling. 
As a result in the event this Court denies PWA's Motion to Dismiss, at the very least, the Court should 
enter an order compelling the parties to submit the matter to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
Purchase Contract. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4. 
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As set forth above, the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1 provide that "[tjhis 
transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after final approval by County of Buyer's timeshare 
project or December 31,1998." It is undisputed that the transaction did not close by December 31, 
1998. It is also undisputed that Summit County never approved CFI's timeshare project. It also 
cannot be disputed that time was of the essence regarding the dates in the transaction. Accordingly, 
under the terms of Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, the Purchase Contract automatically 
terminated as of December 31, 1998. Therefore, as a matter of law, CFFs claims are barred by the 
express language of the Purchase Contract, and'this Court should dismiss the case with prejudice. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE LIS PENDENS 
RECORDED AGAINST THE FROSTWOOD PROPERTY BECAUSE IT CONSTI-
TUTES A WRONGFUL LIEN. 
Even if the Court declines to dismiss the case, it should immediately order that the lis 
pendens recorded against the entire 75-acre Frostwood Property be released. As early as November 
1998, CFI knew or had reason to know that the Purchase Contract would terminate on December 
31,1998, unless the transaction closed or it secured either a new contract or an amendment thereto. 
When the December 31, 1998 closing deadline passed, CFI knew or should have known that the 
Purchase Contract had expired automatically. Because the Purchase Contract terminated, any rights 
CFI had in the Property terminated, and the lis pendens, therefore, constitutes a wrongful lien under 
Utah law. Because CFI knew or had reason to know that the lis pendens was either a wrongful lien 
or "groundless," this Court should declare the lis pendens void ab initio, release the lis pendens, and 
award PWA damages and reasonable attorney's fees under the Wrongful Lien Act. 
Pursuant to section 38-9-1(6) of the Utah Code, a "wrongful lien" is any document "that 
purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
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it is recorded or filed is not, among other things, "expressly authorized by this chapter or another 
state or federal statute" or "signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of 
the real property." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a), (c). The lis pendens recorded by CFI was not 
"expressly authorized" by the wrongful lien statute or another state or federal statute or by any 
document signed by the owner of the Property.4 
A person who records a "wrongful lien" is liable to the property owner for any "actual 
damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien." Id. § 38-9-4(1). The recorder of the wrongful 
lien is farther liable in the amount of SI,000 or treble actual damages, whichever is greater, in the 
event the recorder fails to release the wrongful lien within twenty days from the date of a written 
request, by the property owner, to release the wrongful lien. Id. § 38-9-4(2). When the person who 
recorded the wrongful lien did so "knowing or having reason to know that the document" is a 
"wrongful lien" or "groundless," the person is liable in the amount of $3,000 or treble actual 
damages, whichever is greater. Id. § 38-9-4(3)(a), (b). 
The only reasonable conclusion in this case is that CFI filed this action and recorded the 
accompanying lis pendens fully realizing that the Purchase Contract had terminated and that the lis 
pendens was not authorized to be recorded against the twenty-acre Property subject to the Purchase 
Contract, let alone the entire seventy-five acre Frostwood Property, which now forms an integral part 
In recording the lis pendens, CFI undoubtedly relies on the "DISPUTE RESOLUTION" section of the 
Purchase Contract, which provides that "[n]othing in this - shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific 
performance by the Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the Seller by means of 
summons or otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided 
that the Buyer permits the seller to refrain from serving the complaint pending mediation." This provision, 
however, was superseded by Addendum No. 1, which requires all disagreements to be submitted to 
arbitration and does not expressly permit the recording of a lis pendens "with regard to" arbitration. 
Accordingly, this action and the accompanying lis pendens are not even authorized by Addendum No. 1. 
Because the lis pendens is not authorized, it is a "wrongful lien" under Utah law, and section 38-9-2(2) of 
the Utah Code does not affect this action. This Court, therefore, should immediately release the lien and 
award PWA appropriate damages. 
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of The Canyons SPA As a result, because CFI knew, at the time the lis pendens was recorded, that 
it was not authorized, CFI knew it was a wrongful hen Utah Code Ann § 38-9-l(6)(a), (c) CFI 
further knew that the lis pendens was "groundless" because it had "no arguable basis or is not 
supported by any credible evidence " CommercialInv Corp \ Siggard, 936 P 2d 1105,1111 (Utah 
Ct App), cert denied, 945 P 2d 1118 (Utah 1997)' Indeed, because the Purchase Contract 
automatically expired according to its terms on December 31, 1998, this Court may conclude, as a 
matter of law, that CFI should have known its recording of a lis pendens was "groundless " See 
Winters v Schulman, 977 P 2d 1218, 1223-24 (Utah Ct App ) (concluding that, as a matter of law, 
lis pendens was "groundless" when filed because a review of Utah law would have revealed that lis 
pendens is not entitled to be recorded unless action is pending), cert denied, - P 2d - (Utah 1999) 
Because CFI knew, or should have known, that the lis pendens was a wrongful hen, or that it was 
"groundless," PWA respectfully requests that this Court award it damages, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, pursuant to section 38-9-4 
III. AS A MATTER OF EQUITY, THIS COURT SHOULD CANCEL THE LIS 
PENDENS RECORDED AGAINST THE FROSTWOOD PROPERTY. 
A. CFI Knowingly Allowed The Purchase Contract To Terminate By Its Own 
Terms More Than Eleven Months Ago And Has No Vested Rights in the 
Property. 
CFI's Complaint, although simplistic in its content, was filed just four (4) short days before 
Summit County approved The Canyons SPA (See Complaint.) What is interesting is that CFI 
conveniently fails to attach the agreement that forms the basis of its allegations Rather, it 
gratuitously and inaccurately alleges the terms and conditions of the Purchase Contract in hopes of 
Significantly, in Siggard, the court upheld a jury verdict against buyers of real property who recorded a 
notice of interest against an entire thirty-eight acre parcel, although the buyers were entitled to purchase 
only sixteen acres of the parcel 
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stalling the development of The Canyons SPA and, by such action, extorting a favorable settlement 
out of PWA. Although CFI contends it performed all conditions precedent, one fact remains 
undisputed -- on December 31, 1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated by its own 
terms. Based upon this termination, this Court, as a matter of law, must conclude that CFI has no 
vested rights in the Property. 
B. Laches Precludes CFI From Asserting that the Purchase Contract Did Not 
Terminate By Its Own Terms. 
CFI's main assertion in claiming an interest in the Property rests upon its claim that it is 
entitled to specific performance under the Purchase Contract. (See Complaint, «[«; 2-12.) Putting aside 
the fact that CFI was privy to virtually every decision relating to the development of the Property, 
CFI's argument is irrelevant because of its own inability to comply with the express terms of the 
Purchase Contract and to provide PWA with the necessary architectural drawings to move the 
timeshare development forward. 
More importantly, by the middle of November 1998 (and no later than December 4, 1998), 
CFI knew the deal would not close by December 31, 1998 and that the Purchase Contract would 
expire by its own terms. Yet, it failed to secure either a new agreement or an addendum extending 
the automatic termination date. Once the Purchase Contract terminated, CFI sat back and let PWA 
expend valuable time and resources negotiating with the other participants in putting together The 
Canyons SPA. Then, just four (4) days before The Canyons SPA was approved, CFI suddenly cried 
foul and filed a complaint seeking specific performance. By lying in wait, CFI is barred by the 
doctrine of laches from asserting its claims. 
To establish laches, two elements must be met: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of 
plaintiff and (2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Papanikolas Bros. Enters. 
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256,1260 (Utah 1975). Laches will not apply 
simply from the standpoint of delay, but rather from delay that works a disadvantage to another. Id. 
In the present case, the undisputed facts demonstrate that CFI delayed in a manner that 
worked a disadvantage to PWA. By December 4, 1998, CFI knew that if it did not act. the Purchase 
Contract would terminate as of December 31, 1998. CFI did nothing, however, to ensure it had 
complied with all of the requirements necessary to fulfill the terms of the Purchase Contract. Nor 
did it do anything to have the Purchase Contract reinstated or have a new contract formed. 
Likewise, and equally important, CFI knew that PWA was actively participating in having 
the First SPA Plan amended to include the entire Frostwood Property and that the golf course 
Summit County demanded as part of the approval would require PWA to leave portions of the 
property as open space. CFI knew that PWA was expending considerable time and resources in 
securing approval of The Canyons SPA. Despite this knowledge, CFI provided no support for or 
assistance to this effort. It did nothing to stop the approval of The Canyons SPA. Instead, it sat back 
and, just days before Summit County approval was granted, filed this lawsuit and recorded a lis 
pendens not only against the twenty acres it had hoped to purchase but the entire Frostwood 
Property. 
If CFI truly believed that the Purchase Agreement had not terminated as of December 31, 
1998, it would have been actively involved with PWA in securing approval of The Canyons SPA 
with its proposed development. CFI was not actively involved and, in fact, was virtually 
non-existent. Accordingly, this Court must conclude, as a matter of law, that CFI rested on its rights 
and that its claims are barred by doctrine of laches. 
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C. As A Matter Of Equity, The Court Should Cancel The Lis Pendens Recorded 
By CFI. 
Although a lis pendens is a creature of statute, it has its roots in common-law and equity 
jurisprudence. Kelly v. Perry\ 531 P.2d 139, 140-141 (Ariz. 1975). At common law, the mere 
pendency of a lawsuit purporting to affect title to real property constituted constructive notice to all 
the world. Id:, Dice v. Bender, 117 A.2d 725, 727 (Pa. 1955); McCahill v. Roberts, 219 A.2d 306, 
308 (Pa. 1966). Lis pendens statutes are designed to provide a better form of notice to those who 
may become interested in the real property involved in the litigation. White v. Wensauer, 702 P.2d 
15, 18(Okla. 1985). 
Such statutes, however, do not confer any additional substantive rights than those existing 
at common law. Kelly, 531 P.2d at 140. In fact, these statutes actually limit the scope of a lis 
pendens by making the notice effective only when the action is filed in accordance with the 
statutorily prescribed provisions and the procedural requirements for the lis pendens have been met. 
Wensauer, 702 P.2d at 18. A lis pendens merely operates to bind third parties with notice that any 
interest they may acquire in the property pending litigation will be subject to the outcome of the 
lawsuit. McCahill, 219 A.2d at 309; Dice 117 A.2d at 727. 
Utah has a lis pendens statute. Contained in a chapter of the Utah Code devoted to quiet title 
actions, this statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the 
names of the parties, the objection of the action or defense, and a description of the 
property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice of 
record, only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be 
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deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its 
pendency against parties designated by their real names. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. The statute makes no provision for anyone other than the party claiming 
an interest in the property to file the lis pendens. 
Because the doctrine of lis pendens is derived from notions of common-law and equity 
jurisprudence, it is subject to equitable principles. Wensauer, 702 P.2d at 18. For example, if the 
operation of a lis pendens would prove harsh or arbitrary, a court should use its equity powers to 
refuse to give it effect. Id. Under its broad equity powers, therefore, a court can cancel, release, or 
discharge a notice of lis pendens that might otherwise be burdensome. Id. In Altman v. City of 
Lansing, 321 N.W.2d 707 (Mich. 1981), for example, the trial court quashed a notice of lis pendens, 
and that decision was affirmed on appeal: 
We hold that the lower court did not err in canceling plaintiffs' notice of lis 
pendens. The benefit that plaintiffs would receive under the notice of lis 
pendens is too minimal in comparison to the harm that defendants will 
suffer. In Silberstein v. Silberstein, 252 Mich. 192, 194, 233 N.W. 222 
(1930), the Supreme Court held that a technically proper notice of'lispendens 
which meets all of the statutory requirements could be canceled on equitable 
principles if in the discretion of a trial judge the benefits of the notice are far 
outweighed by the damage it causes. 
If the notice of lis pendens were revived in this case, progress on the Capitol 
Commons Project likely would come to a halt. Thus, defendants stand to be 
greatly harmed by the filing of a notice of lis pendens. On the other hand, it 
is extremely unlikely that plaintiffs will ever succeed in this action. The 
equities then lie entirely on the side of the defendants. Therefore, we find that 
the lower court did not err in canceling the notice of lis pendens. 
Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
Like the plaintiff in Altman, CFI is not entitled to the benefits of a lis pendens when the harm 
it faces is minimal in comparison to the harm imposed upon the entire Canyons SPA development. 
This is a situation in which the benefits to CFI are far outweighed by the damage its lis pendens will 
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cause to PWA and the other SPA participants. (See Participant Affidavits.) Under these 
circumstances, the Court should extinguish the lis pendens recorded against the Property. 
As set forth in the Participant Affidavits, the lis pendens recorded in this action against a 
seventy-acre portion of the Project threatens to undermine the progress of the entire Project, which 
consists of over 7,000 acres. The lis pendens threatens the development of the golf course, which 
is of the utmost priority to Summit County, because the Frostwood Property encompasses four of 
the eighteen holes constituting the golf course. Owners of nearby properties are unable to proceed 
with development of their portions of the Project because of the detrimental effect of the lis pendens. 
As in Altman, the effect of this lis pendens is to likely grind to "a halt" the progress of the entire 
Project. Altman, 321 N.W.2d at 713. PWA and numerous nearby property owners who are part of 
The Canyons SPA "stand to be greatly harmed by the filing of'CFI's lis pendens in this matter." Id. 
In contrast, as in Altman^ii is extremely unlikely that [CFI] will ever succeed in this action." 
Id.6 As set forth above, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated, as a matter of law, on 
December 31, 1998, when the transaction failed to close. Because the benefits, if any, of the lis 
pendens to CFI are far outweighed by the irreparable harm being inflicted on PWA and nearby 
property owners, the equities in this case "lie entirely" on the side of PWA and the other property 
owners. Id.\ see also Perry, 531 P.2d at 141 (refusing to prohibit order canceling lis pendens 
because it had potential to impair development of project on seventy-acre parcel, the court stated that 
Indeed, this action by CFI appears to have been brought for the purpose of tying up the Frostwood Property 
to impede progress on the Project. In that respect, CFFs actions are similar to those of the plaintiff in 
Hillberg, v. Superior Court, 263 Cal. Rptr. 675, 677-78 (Ct. App. 1989). In that case, the court determined 
that the trial court should have considered whether the action had not been commenced in good faith, given 
that the plaintiff property buyer had failed to comply with conditions precedent to the purchase of the 
property. Id. The court specifically noted that "[w]e cannot ignore as judges what we know as lawyers-
that the recording of a lis pendens is sometimes made not to prevent conveyance of the property that is the 
subject of the lawsuit, but to coerce an opponent to settle regardless of the merits." Id. at 677. 
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"[t]he potential future loss to respondents while the case is slowly wending its way through the court 
system is disproportionately high when compared to the petitioner's claimed rights"). Accordingly, 
this Court should use its equitable powers to immediately release the lis pendens. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, PWA respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion 
and enter an order dismissing the action, releasing the lis pendens, and awarding PWA appropriate 
damages, including its attorney's fees, in pursuing the foregoing relief. 
DATED this 8th day of December, 1999. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Craig H. Howe 
Attorneys for Park West Associates and 
Beaver Creek Associates 
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PARKWEST ASSOCIATES, AND 
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
OF PARKWEST ASSOCIATES AND 
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES 
Civil No. 990600361CR 
Judge Pat Brian 
Defendants, Park West Associates ("Parkwest") and Beaver Creek Associates 
("Beaver Creek") (collectively "PWA"), by and through their counsel, Ballard Spahr Andrews & 
Ingersoll, LLP, hereby admit, deny and answer Central Florida Investment, Inc.'s ("CFI") 
Complaint. PWA will respond, paragraph by paragraph, to the allegations in CFI's Complaint. 
Unless hereinafter specifically admitted, however, each and every allegation of the Complaint is 
denied. 
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First Cause of Action 
1. PWA admits that on or about June 14, 1998, CFI and PWA entered into that 
certain Real Estate Purchase Contract, including Addendum No. 1 (the "Purchase Contract"), a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. PWA affirmatively asserts that the Purchase Contract 
speaks for itself and contains all of the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties. 
Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 1 of the 
Complaint. 
2. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the 
Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Complaint. 
3. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the 
Complaint represent CFI's interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Complaint. 
4. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the 
Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint. 
5. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the 
Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
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which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 5 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is 
required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the 
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. 
6. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the 
Complaint represent CFI's interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 5 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is 
required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the 
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Complaint. 
7. PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the Complaint. 
8. PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint. PWA 
affirmatively asserts that CFI is not and never has been ready, willing and able to purchase the 
property consistent with the terms of the Purchase Contract. 
9. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the 
Complaint represent CFI's interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is 
required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the 
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint. 
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10 PWA admits that CFI has elected to sue for "specific performance and/or 
damages" PWA denies any and all remaining allegations contained m paragraph 10 of the 
Complaint 
11 PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the Complaint 
12 PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint 
Second Cause of Action 
13 PWA incorporates by this reference its responses to the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1-12 of the Complaint 
14 PWA admits the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Complaint as 
it relates to the Purchase Contract 
15 PWA lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth 
or veracity of the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and, therefore, denies the 
same 
16 PWA denies the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of the Complaint 
Third Cause of Action 
17 PWA incorporates by this reference its responses to the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1-16 of the Complaint 
18 PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of 
the Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is 
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required, and, therefore, denies the same. Except as expressly admitted herein, PWA denies the 
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the Complaint. 
19. PWA admits that CFI is seeking attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing 
party. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the 
Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response is required. 
Fourth Cause of Action 
20. PWA incorporates by this reference its responses to the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1-19 of the Complaint. 
21. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of 
the Complaint represent CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 21 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is 
required, and, therefore, denies the same. 
22. PWA lacks sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truth and veracity 
of the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of the Complaint and therefore denies the same. 
23. PWA affirmatively asserts that the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of 
the Complaint reflect CFFs interpretation of the Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 1 hereto, 
which document speaks for itself. PWA affirmatively asserts that the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 23 of the Complaint are conclusions of law and that no response thereto is 
required, and, therefore, denies the same. 
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
First Affirmative Defense 
CFFs Complaint fails, in whole or in part, to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
CFI's claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
CFI is estopped by its own conduct or the conduct of its agents from maintaining any 
cause of action against PWA. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
CFFs claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and/or laches. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
CFFs claims are barred by its breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
To the extent CFI has any claim for damages, which claim is expressly denied, PWA 
is entitled to an offset against CFI in the amount of the damages incurred by PWA as a result of 
CFFs breaches of duty and other wrongful acts. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
PWA has been required to obtain counsel to represent it against the claims alleged 
by CFI in this Complaint. PWA is, therefore, entitled to its reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
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incurred herein because CFI's claims are filed in bad faith, are without merit or are otherwise in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
PWA has made improvements to the Property at issue and to the extent CFI has any 
claims for damages related to that Property, which claims are expressly denied, PWA is entitled 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-5 to an offset for the value of those improvements. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
CFI has failed to mitigate its damages. 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
CFI's lis pendens was not filed in accordance with applicable law and CFI also lacks 
standing and has no interest in the Property to justify the filing of a lis pendens. 
Eleventh Affirmative Defense 
CFI's damages, if any, were proximately caused by third parties over whom PWA 
had no control. 
Twelfth Affirmative Defense 
CFI's Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the bad faith conduct of CFI and/or 
its agents. 
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Thirteenth Affirmative Defense 
CFFs claims are barred in whole or in part by the provisions of the Utah Recording 
Act. 
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense 
CFFs claims are barred by principles of equitable and promissory estoppel and, as 
a result, CFI may not seek or claim any interest in the real property that is the subject of this action. 
WHEREFORE, PWA prays for judgment against CFI as follows: That the Complaint 
be dismissed with prejudice and that CFI take nothing thereby; that PWA be awarded its costs of 
suit, including reasonable attorneys fees; and that PWA have such other and further relief as to the 
Court deems just and merited. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, Park West Associates and Beaver Creek Associates 
(collectively "PWA"), complain and allege against counterclaim-defendant, Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Park West Associates is a Utah general partnership, with its principal place 
of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Beaver Creek Associates is a Utah limited partnership, with its principal place 
of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Upon information and belief, CFI is a Florida corporation. 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Counterclaim arises out of the same transactions, occurrences and 
dealings that are the subject matter of CFFs Complaint. 
5. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Rules 13 and 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-13-1 and 78-
13-4. 
7. The declaratory relief requested herein is authorized under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-33-1 et. seq. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
8. In the Spring of 1998, CFI, by and through its real estate agent, Brent Ferrin, 
and PWA engaged in negotiations for the purchase and sale of a twenty-acre parcel located in 
Summit County near The Canyons Ski Resort. In April of 1998, Mr. Ferrin, on behalf of CFI, 
presented a proposed real estate purchase contract to PWA, which proposal went through a number 
of reiterations and addendums. 
9. On or about June 5, 1998, CFI, by and through its agent Brent Ferrin, 
presented to PWA a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "Purchase Contract"), a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference, whereby CFI offered to 
purchase a twenty-acre parcel within the "Frostwood Development at The Canyons" (hereinafter 
"Property") for the purchase price of $15,000,000. Pursuant to the Purchase Contract, CFI was to 
purchase the Property by making a $50,000 earnest money deposit, paying $2,950,000 cash at the 
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time of closing and financing the balance of $12,500.000 over four (4) years. The Purchase Contract 
stated that closing would occur "on the earlier of 12/31/98 or 15 days after Final Master Plan 
approval." 
10. Although the Purchase Contract was a preprinted form used regularly by 
members of the Utah Association of Realtors, it was expressly "subject to" certain "Special 
Contingencies." The Purchase Contract stated that closing would occur "on the earlier of 12/31/98 
or 15 days after Final Master Plan approval," that the "[e]ntire agreement [was] subject to Summit 
County approval of density, zoning and use," and that "time [was] of the essence regarding the dates 
set forth in this transaction." In the event any one of these special contingencies did not occur, the 
Purchase Contract would be rendered null and void and PWA would not be obligated to sell the 
Property to CFI. 
11. On or about June 8, 1998, PWA made a counter-proposal to CFI through an 
addendum to the Purchase Contract ("Addendum No. 1"), a copy of which is also attached as part 
of Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference. 
12. Pursuant to Addendum No. 1, the Purchase Contract was amended to modify 
the foregoing contingencies and to further refine the conditions precedent to closing. In particular, 
it was agreed that PWA would not be responsible for attempting to satisfy the contingency of 
obtaining Final Master Plan approval from Summit County. Instead it was agreed that "Buyer shall 
submit Buyer's plan to Summit County simultaneously with Seller's submittal [for related 
development within the same area]. The Plan shall include architecture for a 400 unit timeshare 
project." In other words, the Buyer accepted full responsibility for satisfying the contingency of 
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obtaining Summit County approval of its timeshare project. CFI never submitted architectural 
drawings for its timeshare project to PWA or Summit County 
13. In addition, PWA and CFI understood and agreed to the following additional 
terms contained in Sections 8 and 9 of Addendum No.l: 
8. a) Summit County has stated that its preferred development is 
timeshare, interval ownership, or hotel/motel; 
8. b) Seller, on its Master Plan, has an additional 257 units of 
whole ownership including 63 residential lots, which shall remain 
such after Buyer's County approvals are received; 
8. c) Summit County and the Canyons have indicated an overall 
square foot parameter of approximately 957,000 square feet; 
8. d) It may be necessary to obtain from Summit County a waiver 
for the additional square footage in the timeshare portion necessary 
for Buyers required units; and 
8. e) If the additional square footage cannot be obtained, this 
contract may be canceled in writing by either Buyer or Seller. 
9. This transaction shall close on the earlier of 15 days after final 
approval by County of Buyer's timeshare project or December 31, 
1998. 
In summary, the Purchase Contract, as a condition to closing, required final Summit County 
approval of 400 timeshare units of approximately 1525 square feet each or 610,000 total square feet, 
257 whole ownership units consisting of 62 luxury single family homes with a contemplated average 
of 4,000 square feet and 195 multi-family units with an average of 2000 square feet for a total of 
638,000 square feet. 
14. Addendum No. 1 further modified the Purchase Contract by providing that 
any disagreement over its terms "shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both Buyer and Seller. 
If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer 
shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and void." PWA expressly demanded 
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the inclusion of this provision for the purpose of avoiding any kind of litigation over the terms of 
the Purchase Contract because of the imminent arrival of the 2002 Olympics. 
15. Finally, Addendum No. 1 expressly provided that "[t]o the extent the terms 
of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the [Purchase Contract], including 
all prior addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control." 
16. On or about June 14,1998, CFI and PWA executed the Purchase Contract and 
Addendum No. 1. 
17. In accordance with the terms of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, 
on June 25,1998, PWA delivered to CFI the following materials relating to the development of the 
Property: 
a. Surrounding Parcels/As Shown on Topo; 
b. Topo Survey; 
c. Documentation of Recent Impact Fees; 
d. Copy of SPA Agreement/Design Guidelines; and 
e. Owners Agreement. 
CFI never responded to either PWA or the architects regarding PWA's designs. 
18. By September 2, 1998, in addition to the items identified in paragraph 17 
above, PWA had delivered to CFI the Master Utility Plan, Perimeter Survey, AGRA Report and 
Geotectonic Report, Alta Title's Preliminary Title Report, and Seller's Property Disclosure. 
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19. In October of 1998, PWA received a copy of a single-page sketch plan for 
CFI's twenty-acre proposed timeshare project from CFI; however, no architectural plans were ever 
submitted to PWA. 
20. Because of CFFs failure to meet established deadlines, including submission 
of a proposed development plan and architecture for 400 timeshare units, on November 12, 1998, 
Marian Crosby and Bill Coleman, on behalf of PWA, notified CFI that the Purchase Contract was 
no longer valid. 
21. On December 4, 1998, a meeting was held between CFI and PWA, whereby 
it was expressly represented to CFI that the terms and conditions precedent contained in the Purchase 
Contract had not been and could not be met by December 31, 1998 and that if CFI wanted to avoid 
terminating the Purchase Contract, a new purchase contract and/or addendum would need to be 
entered into between CFI and PWA before December 31, 1998 to avoid termination. 
22. On December 17, 1998, Mark Waltrip, director of Real Estate and 
Development at CFI, wrote a letter to Dick Frost, a general partner of PWA, to explain why he 
believed the Purchase Contract remained in full force and effect. 
23. Notwithstanding CFI's written assertions, PWA notified representatives of 
CFI that the Purchase Contract terminated by its own terms on December 31,1998 when the parties 
failed to close the sale. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Addendum No. 1 to the Purchase Contract, the 
purchase of the Property was "subject to" this transaction closing "on the earlier of 12/31/98 or 15 
days after" final County approval. Thus, when December 31,1998 came and went without Summit 
County's providing approval of CFI's timeshare project, the Purchase Contract terminated. 
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24. In the early part of 1999. CFI repeatedly made attempts to reinstate the 
Purchase Contract by presenting sev eral proposals to amend. At no time did PWA agree to reinstate 
the Purchase Contract. 
25. With the termination of the Purchase Contract, PWA moved forward with its 
efforts to participate in the amendment of a larger coordinated development being planned for the 
surrounding area of The Canyons Ski Resort. 
a. In late July of 1998, PWA had been approached by adjacent property 
owners about the possibility of expanding the boundaries of The Canyons Specially Planned Area 
Plan (the "First SPA Plan") adopted by Summit County on July 6, 1998 through the efforts of a 
group of property owners: namely, American Skiing Company Resort Properties, Inc., ASC Utah, 
Inc., Iron Mountain Associates, LLC, Wolf Mountain Resort, L.C., C&M Properties, and Groutage. 
Negotiations over the amendment of the First SPA Plan continued among the participants during the 
summer of 1999. 
b. After expressing an interest, PWA executed a "Non-binding Statement 
of Acknowledgment" on behalf of PWA whereby it committed to being included in a proposed 
amendment to the First SPA Plan. 
c. On several occasions, PWA representatives spoke with CFI 
representatives and informed them of PWA's participation in the efforts to amend the First SPA 
Plan. 
26. Beginning in the early part of 1999 and continuing throughout November, 
PWA representatives participated extensively with the adjacent property owners to secure approval 
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from Summit County of an amendment to the First SPA Plan. As part of that process, they attended 
numerous meetings with Summit County to discuss the various proposals, including the County's 
demand that an 18-hole golf course be included within the amended development plan. It became 
apparent that this was one of the central conditions for approval of any amendment to the First SPA 
Plan. The property owners participating in the First SPA Amendment are identified on Exhibit 2 
attached hereto. 
27. On November 15,1999, the Summit County Board of Commissioners ratified 
and approved the amendment to the First SPA Plan (hereinafter "The Canyons SPA"), which had 
been executed previously by PWA on November 8, 1999, and which allocated to the Frostwood 
Project and PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents, including approximately 40,000 
square feet of commercial space. PWA was also obligated to deed 40,000 square feet of approved 
density on four acres to Summit County, further reducing the development entitlements granted to 
the Project and PWA. 
28. Under The Canyons SPA, the approximately seventy-five acre Frostwood 
Property is located within the Project and, in particular, 'The Canyons Resort Center." The Project 
is to be phased in by expansion outward from the "Resort Core," which is adjacent to the Frostwood 
Property. For this reason, construction of the outer planning areas is conditioned upon progress in 
developing the Resort Core and its surrounding areas, including the Frostwood Property. 
29. Under The Canyons SPA, the development of the golf course, which is subject 
to strict deadlines, is one of the two highest priorities, if not the highest priority, in the development 
of the Project. The Frostwood Property's periphery is to be used primarily for open space, including 
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the majority of four holes to be constructed on the golf course. Indeed, section 3.2.6 of The Canyons 
SPA requires, in part, that the parties "ensure that the course is completed within 36 months" of 
November 15, 1999. Failure to meet this deadline could cause a revocation of all development 
entitlements of all participants of The Canyons SPA, including PWA. 
30. Anticipating Summit County's ratification of The Canyons SPA, CFI 
commenced this action and recorded a lis pendens on PWA's entire seventy-five-acre tract with the 
Summit County Recorder's office. 
31. On information and belief, CFI's filing of this action and recording of to 
pendens was made knowing or having reason to know that the claims were groundless since its filing 
of the complaint and recording of the lis pendens are not authorized by the Purchase Contract and 
cover far more property than that which was subject to the Purchase Contract. In fact, CFI's actions 
are expressly barred by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1. 
32. On November 12, 1999, counsel for PWA gave written notice reiterating to 
CFI that the Purchase Contract terminated on December 31,1999. A copy of the Letter from Mark 
R. Gaylord, dated November 12, 1999, is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. PWA's counsel went on to 
explain that: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and reserving to PWA the rights under the 
termination provisions of the Purchase Contract described above, PWA hereby gives 
you written notice that the Purchase Contract is canceled by the Buyer in accordance 
with Addendum No. 1, Items 8C, D and E. Under Sections 8C and 8D of Addendum 
1, CFI acknowledged that the Frostwood Project would require a base density of 
959,000 square feet augmented by the additional square footage necessary for CFI's 
timeshare project. It was contemplated by the parties that approximately 1.2 million 
square feet of approved density would be required in order for CFI to achieve a 400 
unit timeshare project (610,000 total square feet) and for PWA to achieve 62 
residential lots with an average square footage of approximately 4,000 square feet 
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each (248,000 total square feet) and an additional 195 units having approximately 
2,000 square feet each (390,000 total square feet). 
As of November 8,1999, the final Spa Agreement allocated to the Frostwood 
Project and PWA 857,000 square feet or 414.5 unit equivalents (excluding the 
property deeded to Summit County described below), of which approximately 40,000 
is commercial. An additional 40,000 square feet of approved density on four acres 
must be deeded by PWA to Summit County, further reducing the development 
entitlements granted to the Project and PWA. Clearly, the 957,000 square feet 
required by the Purchase Contract was not achieved, let alone the additional square 
footage necessary to permit both a 400 unit timeshare project as well as PWA's 
additional 257 units of whole ownership, including the 62 residential lots. 
Accordingly, subject to its reservation of all rights under the Purchase 
Contract, including the termination described above, PWA hereby cancels the 
Purchase Contract in accordance with Addendum No. 1, Section 8 E, due to Summit 
County's failure to grant the Frostwood Project the minimum square footage 
established as a condition to sale under the Purchase Contract. 
(See Exhibit 3 at pp. 1-2.) Finally, counsel went on to demand that CFI dismiss the complaint and 
release the lis pendens. 
33. As of today's date, CFI has failed to comply with the Purchase Contract by 
dismissing the complaint or releasing the lis pendens. 
34. Because of the lis pendens recorded against the Frostwood property, the 
timely development and completion of the entire golf course has been jeopardized. 
35. CFI's action is threatening the successful completion of The Canyons SPA 
development entirely, including the golf course, and the lis pendens will cause irreparable harm to 
both PWA, as an owner of property subject to The Canyons SPA, and The Canyons SPA 
development itself if not released immediately. This is particularly so, considering the 2002 
Olympics are coming, and, therefore, time is of the essence. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment — Termination of Contract/Quiet Title) 
36. PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 35 of 
the Counterclaim. 
37. A disagreement over the terms of the Purchase Contract has arisen. 
38. On November 9, 1999, CFI commenced this action and filed a lis pendens 
against the Property. 
39. Pursuant to paragraph 16 of the Purchase Contract, CFI alleges that PWA is 
in default and that it is entitled to elect "specific performance and/or damages." 
40. Concurrently, CFI has notified PWA of its intention to mediate in accordance 
with section 15 of the Purchase Contract, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to 
this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest Money 
Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to 
mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association.... Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the 
Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller by filing a complaint with the 
court, serving it on the seller by means of summons or as otherwise permitted by law, 
and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided that the Buyer permit 
the Seller to refrain from answering the complaint pending arbitration. Also the 
parties may agree in writing to waive mediation. 
41. On November 12, 1999, PWA notified CFI that its complaint was not 
authorized in that the Purchase Contract terminated by its own terms on December 31, 1998. (See 
Exhibit 3.) PWA further notified CFI that the filing of the Complaint was not permitted by the 
Purchase Contract in that section 15 was superseded by paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1, which 
provides that "any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties agreed 
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upon by both Buyer and Seller. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning 
of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money back and this agreement shall be null and 
void." 
42. PWA notified CFI that the filing of the Complaint was not permitted under 
the terms and conditions of the Purchase Contract or Addendum No. 1. 
43. PWA further notified that the recording of the lis pendens was wrongful and 
PWA demanded that it be released immediately. CFI's bad faith is evidenced by the fact that it filed 
the lis pendens on seventy-five acres, when the Purchase Contract covered only twenty acres. 
44. Nevertheless, CFI has failed, refused and neglected to dismiss this case and/or 
release the lis pendens. 
45. By virtue of its prior conduct, the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1, 
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1, CFI has waived any and all interest or claim in and/or 
to the Property. 
46. PWA is entitled to a declaratory judgment of this Court as follows: 
(1) Determining that the Purchase Contract terminated by its own terms 
on December 31, 1998; 
(2) Determining and declaring that the lis pendens is void and of no 
effect; 
(3) Quieting title to the Property referenced herein in favor of PWA; and 
(4) Determining and declaring that CFI has no right, title or interest in 
and to the Property. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Filing of Wrongful Lien) 
47. PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 46 of 
the Counterclaim. 
48. The lis pendens purports to create a lien or encumbrance on PWA's interest 
in the Property. 
49. At the time the lis pendens was recorded, it was not expressly authorized by 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, et seq., or another state or federal statute and was, in fact, prohibited by 
the Purchase Contract. 
50. As a result, the lien is a "wrongful lien" under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1. 
51. On November 12, 1999, PWA gave written notice and a request to CFI to 
dismiss the action and immediately release the lis pendens complained of herein. 
52. Upon information and belief, at the time the lis pendens was recorded, CFI 
knew or had reason to know that the lien was "wrongful" or "groundless," under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-9-4(3). 
53. There is no statutory or other specific or legal authority for the lis pendens 
recorded by CFI. PWA has complied with all of the conditions precedent necessary to the bringing 
of an action for damages under the Utah Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. 
54. As a direct, natural and proximate result of CFI's filing of the lis pendens, CFI 
has seriously delayed and inhibited the development of the Property, The Canyons SPA ,and the golf 
course; and PWA has incurred damages thereby in amounts to be proven at trial. 
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55. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 and -3, PWA is entitled to an order 
adjudging the lien to be wrongful, declaring the lis pendens void ab initio, and releasing the lis 
pendens from the Property. PWA is also entitled to recover from CFI those damages proven at trial 
and to have those damages trebled. 
56. PWA has incurred attorneys' fees and will continue to incur attorneys' fees 
in this matter as a result of the wrongful acts of CFI. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 and -3, 
PWA is likewise entitled to recover from CFI its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment — Waiver and Estoppel) 
57. PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 56 of 
the Counterclaim. 
58. CFI, by and through its principals, promised, agreed and represented, among 
other things, that in the event a disagreement arose the parties would submit the matter to arbitration 
and that if "agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration 
process" then the "buyer shall receive its money back" and the "agreement shall be null and void." 
CFI knew or should have reasonably foreseen that this promise was made upon the understanding 
that the parties wanted to avoid litigation at all costs and that PWA relied upon this provision in 
pursuing and closing upon the sale and purchase of the Property. 
59. PWA did rely, to its detriment, upon the foregoing agreement of CFI. In 
agreeing to sell the Property, PWA likewise relied upon all other terms and conditions of the 
Addendum No. 1. PWA was thus directly induced into entering into the Purchase Contract as a 
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result of CFI's commitment that, in the event of a dispute, if an agreement could not be reached 
resolving same, the parties would go their separate ways without litigation. 
60. The acts of CFI in persuading PWA to sell the Property, to attend all of the 
operative meetings and negotiation sessions with Summit County relating to the development of the 
area and to retain various engineers and consultants to assist in the development, not only of its own 
project, but the proposed project of CFI bars CFI from asserting any claim to the Property. By these 
same acts and/or the lack of having taken any required action, CFI has further waived any such 
claims it might otherwise have to the Property and the Court should so declare. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
61. PWA incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 60 of 
the Counterclaim. 
62. CFI's breaches of the Purchase Contract, including but not limited to its 
recording of a lis pendens and asserting other claims against the Property in direct violation of 
section 12 of Addendum No. 1 and in breaching its many agreements with PWA that it would 
cooperate with PWA to achieve the closing and that it would not claim an interest in the Property, 
constitute a breach of CFI's obligations of good faith and fair dealing implied in all Utah contracts. 
63. Moreover, it was reasonably foreseeable at the time the Purchase Contract was 
entered into that a breach would impair and hinder any owner's future use and development of the 
Property. As a result of CFI's breach of their covenants and obligations of good faith and fair 
dealing, PWA has been naturally, directly and proximately damaged, including consequential and 
incidental damages, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
64. PWA incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
through 63 of the Counterclaim. 
65. CFI did contract and agree to purchase the Property from PWA on the terms 
and conditions of the Purchase Contract and Addendum No. 1. 
66. PWA gave good and valuable consideration for its sale of the Property. 
67. In contrast, CFI has tendered virtually no consideration for this agreement. 
It failed to submit its required documents as stipulated in the Purchase Contract. Except for the 
submittal of a single preliminary plan, CFI has done nothing to comply with the terms of the 
Purchase Contract. Inexplicably, it has now brought an action against PWA seeking specific 
performance under a contract that expired by its own terms on December 31, 1998. 
68. If PWA is delayed in the development of the Property or if The Canyons SPA 
cannot proceed as approved because of CFI's wrongful suit and lien, PWA is entitled to damages, 
including all of the incidental or consequential damages which naturally, directly and proximately 
occur as a result of CFI's breach of contract, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, PWA prays for judgment as follows: 
a. On its First Cause of Action, for an order determining that the Purchase Contract 
terminated by its own terms on December 31,1998; determining and declaring that the lis pendens 
is void and of no effect; quieting title to the Property referenced herein in favor of PWA; and 
determining and declaring that CFI has no right, title or interest in and to the Property; 
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b. On its Second Cause of Action, for an order adjudging the lien to be wrongful, 
declaring the lis pendens void ab initio, and releasing the lis pendens from the Property, and for 
treble damages, as proven at trial; 
c. On its Third Cause of Action, for an order declaring that CFI is estopped to assert, 
or has waived, any claims it might have to the Property; 
d. On its Fourth Cause of Action against CFI, for damages in an amount proven at trial; 
e. On its Fifth Cause of Action against CFI, for damages in an amount proven at trial; 
f. On all causes of action, for costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees; and 
g. On all causes, for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and merited. 
DATED this 7th day of December 1999. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
(^C<^< 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Craig H. Howe 
Attorneys for Park West Associates and 
Beaver Creek Associates 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




FARKWEST ASSOCIATES and 
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 990600361 
This matter is before the Court pursuant to defendants f Motion 
to Dismiss and Quiet Title• On December 20, 1999, Judge Pat Brian 
set this Motion for hearing on January 6, 2 000. An Order 
memorializing Judge Brian's ruling was signed by this Court on 
January 3, 2000. That Order was amended in minor particulars by 
the stipulation of the parties dated December 30, 1999, including 
continuance of the hearing until January 10, 2 000, but the 
following provision was unchanged: "The scope of the hearing shall 
not be limited in any respect unless an agreement between counsel 
is reached prior to the commencement thereof relating to the full 
release of the Lis Pendens." No agreement to limit the hearing was 
either submitted in writing or proffered to the Court on January 
10, 2000. 
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Accordingly, the Court rules that the hearing was not limited 
and, moreover, the hearing constituted, among other things, an 
appropriate summary proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 
38-9-7, thus permitting the Court to address the issue of the 
alleged wrongful lien in the form of the revised Lis Pendens. 
The issues before the Court were defendants1 Motion to Dismiss 
and Quiet Title, the latter part of which specifically sought 
cancellation of the Lis Pendens, regardless of any other rulings. 
The motion was well-briefed and effectively argued by both sides. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that, based on the 
numerous and substantial affidavits submitted to the Court, the 
Motion to Dismiss must be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Defendants argue that the Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the 
"Contract"), along with Addendum No. 1 (the "Addendum"), 
indisputably expired on its terms; therefore, plaintiff's action 
must fail on all counts and the Lis Pendens must be released or 
canceled. Alternatively, even if there are material factual issues 
that bar summary judgment in its entirety, defendants argue that 
there is no basis for specific performance of the contract and 
plaintiff must be limited to an action for damages. Finally, 
defendants contend that under no circumstances should the Lis 
Pendens be allowed to stay in place, either because there is no 
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basis in law, or because equitable principles demand its 
cancellation. 
This Court agrees that, even reading all material facts in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no basis for an Order 
of specific performance. Without limitation, the Court finds that 
the undisputed facts show that: plaintiff has not performed all of 
its commitments under the Agreement and Addendum (this is true even 
if the contract did not expire solely on its terms—even if the 
factfinder ultimately determines that defendants1 acts and/or 
omissions contributed to the failure of the terms); it is 
impossible for the parties to perform the Agreement and Addendum as 
contemplated; and even if all other conditions existed justifying 
specific performance, plaintiff has an adequate and ascertainable 
remedy in damages. On the other hand, numerous material factual 
disputes bar summary judgment on the damages and related claims. 
Accordingly, defendants are hereby granted partial summary 
judgment, dismissing the First Cause of Action, with prejudice. 
With respect to the final issue, in the absence of the 
availability of specific performance, the justification for a Lis 
Pendens that encumbers the property and impedes an admittedly time-
sensitive project is diminished. The equities weigh against 
permitting the Lis Pendens to remain, and the Addendum provision 
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regarding arbitration (which procedure would terminate after a mere 
sixty days if unsuccessful) is evidence that the parties were 
loathe to impede the development if the Agreement faltered and a 
dispute ensued. To allow the Lis Pendens to remain in force under 
these circumstances would be absolutely contrary to that intention, 
and the harm to defendants and other affected parties far outweighs 
any potential benefit to plaintiff. Plaintiff's own arguments, 
while not persuasive to the extent that they establish a potential 
right to specific performance, nevertheless give cogent support to 
defendants' contention that delay in the proposed project threatens 
substantial loss to many parties. Accordingly, the Court rules 
that the Lis Pendens shall be canceled. 
Counsel for defendants shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry, granting defendants' partial summary judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's First Cause of Action for specific 
performance and further ordering that the Lis Pendens shall be 
withdrawn or canceled. Plaintiff's remaining claims are unaffected 
by this Ruling. . 
Dated this />r day of Januaryi 
ROBERT K. 
DISTRICT C8B& .JUDGE y,





Mark R. Gaylord (#5073) 
Craig H. Howe (#7552) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2221 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801)531-3001 
Counsel for Defendants, Park West Associates and 
Beaver Creek Associates 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and 
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
INC., 
) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
> QUIET TITLE 
I Civil No. 990600361CR 
i Judge Robert Hilder 
The Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title filed by Park West Associates ("Park West") and 
Beaver Creek Associates ("Beaver Creek") (collectively "PWA") came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Robert Hilder in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, State of Utah, on 
xMonday, January 10, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Mark R. Gaylord and Craig H. Howe appeared on behalf 
UT_DOCS_A 1031594 v1 Uf\f\K F F » lAwt / O A 
No.. 
F I L E D 
By_ 
T,„; I^.nc^rt g ^ . 
Deputy Clerk, Eurr^M CC'i/rr; 
of PWA. Robert W. Payne and Todd M. Shaughnessy appeared on behalf of Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. r C F r ) . On January 14, 2000, this Court entered its Minute Entry announcing 
its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. 
Based on the Motion to Dismiss and Quiet Title and the memorandum and other materials 
filed in support thereof, the opposing memorandum and supporting materials, the arguments of 
counsel and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Based on the numerous and substantial affidavits submitted to the Court, PWA's 
xMotion to Dismiss and Quiet Title is'treated as a motion for summary judgment; 
2. PWA's Motion is GRANTED, in part; 
3. Without limitation, the undisputed facts show that CFI has not performed all of its 
commitments under the Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") and Addendum No. 1; 
it is impossible for PWA and CFI to perform the Agreement and Addendum No. 1 as contemplated; 
and, even if all other conditions existed justifying specific performance, CFI has an adequate and 
ascertainable remedy in damages; 
4. CFI's First Cause of Action for specific performance is dismissed with prejudice; and 
5. In light of the dismissal, with prejudice, of CFI's First Cause of Action for specific 
performance, CFI shall, within five (5) days after the entry of this Order, record in the Summit 
County Recorder's Office a Full Release of Lis Pendens, in the form attached as Exhibit "A," which 
shall fully release the Notice of Lis Pendens recorded by CFI on November 9, 1999 and the Notice 
of Partial Release of Lis Pendens recorded by CFI on December 30, 1999. 
UT DOCS A 1031594 v1 - 2 -
DATED this clav ol 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
lorable Robert Hilder 
Third Judicial District Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND CONTENT: 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
Alan L. Sullivan, Esq. 
Robert W. Payne, Esq. 
Todd M. Shaughnessy, Esq. 
Attorneys for Central Florida Investments, Inc. 
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BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 990600361 
Hearing 
Electronically recorded on 
May 17, 2000 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ROBERT HILDER 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants: 
ROBERT W. PAYNE 
Nelson/Rasmussen/Christensen 
215 South State Street 
Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8400 
MARK R. GAYLORD 
CRAIG H. HOWE 
Ballard/Spahr/Andrews/Inger 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Mam Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: {801)531-3000 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 South California Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: ( 801)377-0027 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on May 17, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: This is the matter of Central Florida 
4 Investments, Inc. versus Park West Associates, et al., case 
5 990600361. It's the defendant's motion to compel arbitration. 
6 Counsel, please state appearances. 
7 MR. GAYLORD: Mark Gaylord and Craig Howe appearing on 
8 behalf of the defendants, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 MR. PAYNE: Robert Payne appearing on behalf of Central 
11 Florida Investments, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel, and thank you for, 
13 Mr. Payne, the binder with all of the pleadings in the cases. 
14 I have read everything that was provided, and I appreciate it 
15 being provided so well. 
16 You may proceed as you wish, Mr. Gaylord. 
17 MR. GAYLORD: Thank you, your Honor. Why we're here, 
18 as the Court already knows, we're here on defendant's motion to 
19 compel arbitration, your Honor. You may recall we were here on 
20 January 10tn for an additional motion. 
21 THE COURT: I remember well. 
22 MR. GAYLORD: And the Court has ruled on that. The 
23 dispute that is at issue here is a dispute over the terms and 
24 conditions of the Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
25 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
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1 MR. GAYLORD: The plaintiff, CFI, which is a very 
2 sophisticated and experienced land development from Orlando, 
3 Florida, has filed this action in effort to grab in breach of 
4 their agreement and in breach of that agreement the Frostwood 
5 property, about a 20 acre parcel of the property, which is an 
6 essential piece of the Canyons Development. As the Court may 
7 recall -- and if you don't mind, I'll come up to the chart. 
8 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
9 MR. GAYLORD: The Frostwood property is property that 
10 is outlined here in the shaded area, but is one integral part 
11 of a much larger 7,000 acre development called the Canyons, I 
12 think the Court's aware of. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
14 MR. GAYLORD: And the property that is in dispute, for 
15 purposes of this litigation, is actually the 14-acre parcel — 
16 and I've got it upside down — but the 14-acre parcel that's 
17 the subject of the Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 MR. GAYLORD: So as a precursor to that, that's where 
20 the dispute lies. The purpose of this hearing, of course, is 
21 to compel CFI to arbitrate the disagreements that have arisen 
22 between it and Park West over the terms of the agreement. I'm 
23 sure the Court has read the memoranda. If the Court has any 
24 question to begin with, I'm happy to answer those. 
25 THE COURT: I have, and maybe not questions as much as 
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1 focusing where I'm concerned. I think your biggest problem is 
2 the waiver argument. I don't think it's as big an issue as on 
3 the question of whether they need to rise from the agreement, 
4 but I know we'll hear more about that from the plaintiffs. I 
5 think waiver is a very significant issue here. 
6 I'm quite familiar with Chandler; just by coincidence, 
7 that was in my firm. We had Mass Mutual, and I was very close 
8 with the partner who dealt with that day in and day out. I 
9 remember when that was all settled, he said, "Whatever you do, 
10 don't get involved in a litigation if you want arbitration." 
11 MR. GAYLORD: Okay. 
12 THE COURT: I do see your point about the lis pendens, 
13 but didn't you do more9 
14 MR. GAYLORD: Didn't we do what? 
15 THE COURT: Didn't you do more than address the lis 
16 pendens, which I understand the urgency there. If I remember 
17 correctly, didn't you bring it under the expedited Statute 30? 
18 MR. GAYLORD: We did, your Honor, bring it up under 
19 that statute, and I'll address that straight out. I think that 
20 it's important to understand what the Court said in its minute 
21 entry, because the lis pendens issue was important to us, and 
22 because of the way that the action was filed, the Court said — 
23 and the Court recognized in its effort to dismiss the portion 
24 of the cause of action for specific performance — the Court 


























to remain, and the addendum provision regarding arbitration, 
which procedure would terminate after a mere 60 days if 
unsuccessful is evidence that the parties were loathe to 
impede the development if the agreement faulted in a disputing 
suit." 
Now, because of the method or the course of action 
that the plaintiff took here, which is instead of moving to 
arbitrate, which the agreement expressly provides, they filed 
an action. Filed an action against the development that had 
time restraints. 
As the Court may recall when we were here in January, 
there was a significant number of affidavits submitted that 
indicated the failure to begin construction and improvement 
of golf course, which was time based, could have a detrimental 
affect on the entitlements to the Frostwood property, as well 
as other property owners within the Canyons Development. 
So consequently, the defendants were faced with a 
difficult task. That is, "How do we get the lis pendens and 
the specific performance claims kicked out, while at the same 
time we need to arbitrate?" We could have certainly, and m 
fact did indicate to the plaintiffs the need to arbitrate 
pursuant to the provisions of the contract, but because of 
the pendency of the litigation, we had to immediately move to 
dismiss, and to seek to get the lis pendens released so that it 
didn't hinder the development project, and the Court suggested 
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1 that in its ruling, I think. 
2 In addition, just I think also as we go through the 
3 process, Mr. Segal, David Segal, who was the president of the 
4 plaintiff, admitted in his affidavit that CFI was anxious that 
5 the aeal not be delayed, to insure that its timeshare units 
6 were completed by the 2002 Winter Olympics. 
7 Ergo, why did we change to modify the initial Real 
8 Estate Purchase Contract to contain a new arbitration clause 
9 in the addendum9 The purpose for it and the purpose for the 
10 parties agreeing to it was to avoid the very litigation we find 
11 ourselves in here today. 
12 THE COURT: Uh-huh 
13 MR. GAYLORD: What the agreement says — and I will get 
14 to your issue on the waiver, because I think it's an important 
15 issue, but I think it's also important to understand and see 
16 what the provisions that are in conflict are, and why — then I 
17 can address the waiver issue. 
18 The parties conflict, and what plaintiffs argue 
19 is paragraph 15 is not in conflict with paragraph 12 of the 
20 addendum. In paragraph 15 provides in part in the Real Estate 
21 Purchase Contract that the parties agree that any dispute or 
22 claim related to this contract, including but not limited to 
23 the disposition of the earnest money deposit, and the breach 
24 or termination of this contract shall first be submitted to 
25 arbitration. Then it goes on and talks about the means of 
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1 arbitration. 
2 They say that can be read concurrently with the 
3 addendum, which contains in paragraph 12 the quote that 
4 "Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be 
5 arbitrated by parties, agreed upon by both buyer and seller. 
6 If agreement cannot be reached within 60 days from the 
7 beginning of an arbitration process, buyer shall receive 
8 its money back, and this agreement shall be null and void." 
9 Now, the importance of these two provisions, and 
10 the reason that I — that the defendants contend that is in 
11 conflict with paragraph 12 is because there is a disagreement, 
12 it shall be arbitrated. Well, the disagreement here is going 
13 to be "What is the remedy'*" 
14 In this paragraph it says, "You first must mediate." 
15 It then goes on, if the Court may recall -- and I can put it up 
16 here — 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
18 MR. GAYLORD: it then goes on even more and talks about 
19 first of all you have to go through the rules. You follow the 
20 buyer and seller, use the Real Estate Mediation Rules of the 
21 American Arbitration Association. "Each party agrees to bear 
22 its own costs. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant 
23 to the mediation shall be binding, and if mediation fails, 
24 procedures applicable and remedies available under this 
25 contract shall apply." 
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1 Then it goes through and says, "Nothing in this 
2 section shall prohibit the buyer from seeking specific 
3 performance," and also "The parties may agree in writing to 
4 waive mediation." Well, the parties agreed to arbitrate, not 
5 to mediate. 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. From the first reading of that 
7 language, that 60-aay provision, it's always troubled me in 
8 the back of my mind that when it talked about failure to reach 
9 agreement in 60 days, that's more a mediation concept than an 
10 arbitration concept. So I don't think it helps — it's just 
11 another confusion to me, but it's a confusion. 
12 MR. GAYLORD: Whether it's a mediation or arbitration 
13 concept, your Honor, the key is what's the remedy in the end. 
14 What the parties contracted for is whether it's a mediation or 
15 an arbitration, what the parties contracted for is the remedy, 
16 and that's what's important here. 
17 The remedy is contract — they get back here this 
18 morning, and the contract is null and void if they can't reach 
19 an agreement on the terms of the dispute. 
20 THE COURT: But you don't reach an agreement on an 
21 arbitration, do you, Mr. Gaylord? It's imposed upon you. 
22 MR. GAYLORD: Ordinarily, yes, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Yes, and then it comes to one other issue 
24 for me that no one raised directly, but it troubled me, too, as 
25 I read. That is, in this case — I mean, what I said in the 
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mmute entry I think is correct. There was definitely an 
intent to not let this drag out, but isn't it possible that 
this is a sham in the sense that if you can — if this is sort 
of an agreement thing, if I say, "Arbitrate," you have your 60-
day provision, if it can just be dragged out 60 days, it's all 
over. It could be — the whole intent could be thwarted. 
MR. GAYLORD: Certainly the intent to be thwarted, I 
guess if there's any cause of action that it stems from, is if 
there was a bad faith effort in the context of the arbitration. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. GAYLORD: If somehow we don't have a reasonable 
effort to try and reach an agreement. What the arbitration 
provision provides, I think, is the arbitration provision 
provides that, look, we have a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
that was entered into early on in the process. We didn't know 
what Summit County was going to do. This is what they had 
hoped for, and if we could meet those terms and conditions 
based upon a collective effort, not just by Park West, but 
by CFI. 
As the Court may recall, one of the factors the Court 
looked at in whether specific performance could be implied, is 
was there an impossibility of performance, and whether or not 
CFI had complied with its side of the bargain. The Court, I 
think, found that it didn't. So — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, I remember. 
H7QQ 
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1 MR. GAYLORD: And so we're sitting at a point where we 
2 have two parties who may want to still structure a deal, so 
3 they have an arbitration clause that says, "Look, if we don't 
4 have the agreement as we've currently written it, we've got an 
5 arbitration clause. Let's see if we can sit down and negotiate 
6 a new deal." 
7 If we can't, all you're going to do is get back 
8 your earnest money. We don't want to have to waste our time 
9 fighting over, you know, whether you have what you have, and 
10 if they don't, they get a null and void. It's rendered null 
11 and void because they don't want to delay it any further, if 
12 they can't reach an agreement on what the development will look 
13 like. 
14 So that's what the purpose of the agreement was, and 
15 that's what both sides will say. Both sides will say that they 
16 had an arbitration clause. They put it in there. They agreed 
17 to it. Yet they couldn't reach an agreement on an arbitration 
18 if there was a dispute over the terms of the contract, because 
19 there is a dispute over what happens to the earnest money. 
20 They think they get to file a litigation, pursuant to 
21 paragraph 15. Our position is they don't. Why don't they? 
22 Because if you look at two things; one, if you look at the 
23 addendum, it says, "To the extent the terms of this addendum 
24 modify or conflict with any provisions of the RVPC, including 
25 all prior addendum counter offers, these terms shall control." 
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1 I submit that there was a conflict between these two, 
2 because the conflict arises from the disposition of the earnest 
3 money deposit. If you look down here, paragraph 12 tells you 
4 what the disposition of the earnest money contract is — money 
5 is, if they can't reach agreement on the arbitration. It is, 
6 it gets back, and that's it. They say, "No, we can go ahead 
7 and file a lawsuit." There's a conflict there. 
8 More importantly is, under subsection 16 of the RAPC 
9 it says, "Where a section of this contract provides a specific 
10 remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive, 
11 regardless of rights, which might otherwise be available under 
12 common law. " 
13 The exclusive remedy under this arbitration clause is 
14 that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void. That's 
15 the remedy. They agreed when they signed the deal that they 
16 wouldn't litigate this case, because of the time frames that 
17 they were operating under. 
18 Yeah, they want to now bring back 15 and say, "But we 
19 can file a lawsuit. If we first mediate, and if we don't have 
20 successful mediation, then we're going to proceed with our 
21 litigation. 
22 I submit that this was to wipe out paragraph 15, and 
23 intended to be a replacement. It's in direct conflict with 
24 that, and it can't be read together, and because it can't be 
25 read together, it must file the addendum. The addendum is 
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controlling. 
To address the issue of waiver, your Honor, unless the 
Court has any other questions. 
THE COURT: No, I confess I don't. I think I agree 
with you, and I'll hear argument, that as a general rule, the 
addendum should control, but if the addendum doesn't really 
provide anything, then I'm wondering where we are. That's 
where I'm struggling; if it really does provide an arbitration 
option. 
Generally when we order arbitration we're saying, 
"This is not going to be your forum. Arbitration is. You 
are going to get a binding decision out of a neutral partial 
arbitration," supposedly. 
Here, though, it's such a hybrid of arbitration and 
mediation, with the ability to say that if agreement doesn't 
occur within 60 days, you've got nothing except — and maybe 
this was the intent — you've got nothing but the earnest 
money. We're all moving on because the project is paramount 
thing here. Is that what you're saying? 
MR. GAYLORD: Well, in fact, I think that's exactly 
what Mr. Segal is saying in his affidavit. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. GAYLORD: He's suggesting in his affidavit that 
time is of the essence. In the contract it has a time of the 
essence clause. He says, "Based upon my visit with Brent 
n'-/ A n 
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Ferrin — " this is reading from paragraph 7. ''Based upon my 
visit with Brent Ferrin, I decided to see if I should purchase 
the Frostwood property. I was very interested in the terms 
upon Park West was offering the CFI parcel. I understood that 
the Frostwood parcel was reserved quality real estate, being 
sold with all the necessary zoning and permitting (inaudible). 
Thus upon purchasing the property, CFI could quickly commence 
construction on the property in plenty of time to complete 
construction for 2002 Winter Olympics." 
However, we're now tied up in litigation. There is 
no way that this litigation will be conducted and completed in 
time for litigation. 
THE COURT: The litigation probably wouldn't — is the 
project at a halt, or has the prior actions of the Court at 
least allowed things to go forward? I mean, what's the status? 
MR. GAYLORD: The project is not at a halt, and in fact 
the project is moving forward. Because of the release of the 
lis pendens, we're in the position — our clients are of the 
view they have no contractual obligation to CFI. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. GAYLORD: However, they've expressed a willingness, 
I think, between the parties, that if they want to sit down 
and talk about a new deal, they can. As you know, we filed a 
counterclaim. We filed a counterclaim that there had been a 
25 breach of contract on the other side, and they have no rights 
n 
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under the Real Estate Purchase Agreement. As you may recall, 
times back to our argument is — one of the arguments is the 
contract terminated on its own. 
4 I THE COURT: Yeah. 
5 MR. GAYLORD: And so we don't think they have a cause 
6 of action. We don't think they have a valid claim. Yet our 
7 position is we ought to move to compel to arbitrate, and we 
8 will arbitrate whatever disputes they want, including whether 
9 they're entitled to develop the property. But we say that the 
10 contract terminated by some terms, which in and of itself is 
11 a dispute over the terms of the contract. So, you know, our 
12 submission is that paragraph 12 of the addendum is controlling, 
13 and of course shouldn't even consider paragraph 15 for purposes 
14 of the motion. 
15 As to the issue of waiver, your Honor, I think it's 
16 very simple. From day one, the defendants have asserted the 
17 need to compel arbitration, and that in the November 12th 
18 letter, four days after the complaint was filed, I wrote a 
19 letter to Counsel for CFI and stated, quote, "Due to the 
20 termination of the purchase contract, the filing of the 
21 complaint, the recording of the lis pendens was improper." 
22 Paragraph 12 of the addendum No. 1 expressly provides 
23 that, quote, "Any agreement over the terms of this agreement 
24 shall be arbitrated by parties agreed upon by both buyer and 
25 seller." 
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1 Paragraph 12 was included in the parties agreement for 
2 the express purpose of avoiding litigation. More importantly, 
3 this paragraph supercedes and replaces Section 15 of the 
4 purchase agreement, and that it conflicts with the rights of 
5 the parties to submit the matter to mediation, since terms of 
6 the addendum modify and conflict with Section 15 and the terms 
7 that addendum No. 1 controlled. On November 12th we gave them 
8 that notice. 
9 In our motion to dismiss, footnote 3, we indicate to 
10 the Court, and in fact at the hearing I commented just on — we 
11 didn't delve into it, but we offhandedly commented that, you 
12 know, alternatively the Court could certainly compel us to 
13 arbitrate this proceeding. So immediately upon the motion to 
14 dismiss, we set forth our demand for arbitration. 
15 In addition, on the time — date to filed our motion 
16 to dismiss, the defendants filed an answer and a counterclaim. 
17 Mr. Payne and the plaintiff makes light of the fact that "Well, 
18 gee, our answer doesn't contain an affirmative defense, that 
19 arbitration is the appropriate means." 
20 Yet our counterclaim, which is attached and is part 
21 of the answer and counterclaim, in four of the five causes of 
22 action assert that the remedy in this case is arbitration. 
23 So to suggest to the Court that we didn't even raise it in 
24 our answer that the counterclaim is a bit disingenuous. It's 
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our motion to compel, so the delay is not there. 
If you're familiar with the Chandler case, your Honor, 
I think you'll recognize in that case there was a considerable 
amount of discovery that went on. Particularly there were five 
depositions, I think. One of which was taken down in Florida, 
and there were I think, if I recall, at least three sets of 
discovery, written discovery requests that were sent out. 
That simply has not occurred in this case. I know 
plaintiffs says, "We started to draft some discovery, and 
stopped after we got the motion to compel." I submit to your 
Honor that the amount of discovery in the case in that instance 
was very different than the situation here. You don't have a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract that's involved. You don't have 
a development that was time intensive. It was a dispute over 
an insurance contract, and so the circumstances were very 
different. 
You also, under the paragraph 15, it doesn't bar, for 
example, the plaintiffs — or the defendants from concurrently 
seeking legal redress in the Courts. It just says that the 
buyer permits the seller to refrain from the answer in the 
















However, if the lis pendens is causing damage to 
the seller because they don't believe that the contract is in 
force, certainly we shouldn't have to sit and wait for that lis 
pendens and the arbitration proceeding to go forward to get the 
relief that we felt was necessary in order to (inaudible) time 
constraints. 
Finally, I guess, as to the issue of waiver, your 
Honor. I mean, we did provide Rule 26-A disclosures, I think, 
under the time constraints of the rules. We had an obligation 
to do that. Other than that, we really have taken no discovery 
whatsoever. They have also, I think, your Honor, failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice, as a result of the short delay — I 
would call it a short delay in moving to compel arbitration. I 
mean, I don't even think it's a delay. I think we've raised 
15 the issue from the get-go. The claim substitute — they claim 
16 the subsequent ruling demonstrates the prejudice. I think 
17 they're wrong. 
18 The issue that we sought was simply to eliminate the 
19 specific performance, which this Court found their claim was 
20 wrongful, that the lis pendens was wrongful, and therefore our 
21 motion was well taken. 
22 The claims of form shopping lack any evidence, and 
23 the claims of substantial expense in their own pleadings, they 
24 indicate that the expense was tied towards defending the motion 



























Real Estate Purchase Contract we would be entitled to recover 
our fees, as a result of the motion for the partial summary 
judgment being granted in our favor. 
Based upon the express terms of the parties agreement, 
your Honor, Park West respectfully requests this Court to enter 
an order compelling the parties to arbitrate their agreement, 
in accordance with paragraph 12 of the addendum. 
We further ask this Court to dismiss this action on 
the grounds that the remedy available to the parties lies 
exclusively within paragraph 12, which is if we don't reach 
agreement through the arbitration, the contract is null and 
void, and their only remedy is a recovery of their earnest 
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we 
agreed to do, that they should then submit that to 60 days of 
arbitration, which really was much more like mediation, figure 
out what they meant, make sure they had a meeting of the minds, 
and then go forward with the project. 
What was not intended by the parties was Park West 
could use that provision as a fulcrum to pursue a relationship 
with a different buyer, and to walk away with no other remedy 
to CFI than the return of the earnest money. 
Your Honor, there is no sense of urgency now. We have 
a hearing on January 10th. We argue to the Court that in fact 
the lis pendens should stay in place. That we should resolve 
that issue before going forward with the project. The Court 
didn't agree with our position, dismissed the lis pendens — 
or released the lis pendens, dismissed the claim for specific 
performance, and has allowed CFI — or Park West to go forward 
with the project. 
Now the issue before the Court is damages. In fact, 
contrary to Mr. Gaylord's representations concerning what their 
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1 motion to dismiss — which in reality was a motion for summary 
2 judgment was all about, was much more than simply an attempt to 
3 release a lis pendens. In fact, in the Court's ruling, the 
4 Court dismissed some of our claims for specific performance, 
5 but in fact left in place — denied the motion with respect to 
6 the remaining claims on (inaudible) the damages. 
7 Essentially Park West's argument, your Honor, is that 
8 the parties when they reached agreement negotiated away their 
9 typical right to come before a Court and have issues of breach 
10 of contract resolved by a Court. Instead what they put m 
11 place was a 60-day arbitration period, where the parties would 
12 try to agree to resolve their disputes, and if they couldn't 
13 do so, then the only remedy that remained was the return of 
14 the earnest money. 
15 We, as I have just indicated, strongly disagree with 
16 that, but assuming that was what the parties agreed to do, it 
17 is quite clear from the Chandler case that Park West could 
18 waive that right. 
19 CFI brought this action because they disagreed with 
20 that interpretation of the contract and believed that they 
21 had a contractual right to pursue a legal remedy, and it was 
22 incumbent upon Park West if they believed that arbitration was 
23 the only way that parties were allowed to go, to present that 
24 to the Court. 
25 It is our obligation and our burden to demonstrate a 
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waiver in this case. To do so, we have to demonstrate to the 
Court that Park West has participated in the litigation to a 
point which is inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and 
that in fact that CFI has been prejudiced. 
Your Honor, if I may approach — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. PAYNE: -- the exhibit stand here, and I apologize. 
I typically reduce this. I'm just going to have to come at the 
side. We've put together this chronology, your Honor, that we 
believe accurately and fully demonstrates the events that have 
taken place that in fact waive Park West's right to pursue 
arbitration to the extent that they have that right. 
Your Honor, on November 9th, CFI filed its complaint 
against Park West. On December 8th, Park West filed its answer, 
and in that answer it asserted 14 affirmative defenses, and 
did not assert as an affirmative defense the right to pursue 
arbitration. 
In connection with the answer, your Honor, on the 
same date filed a counterclaim against Park West. Contrary 
to Mr. Gaylord's representation, it was not a demand for 
arbitration. In fact, what they sought to do was to terminate 
the contract, to quiet title to the property, to obtain damages 
for their allegation of a wrongful lien, to argue waiver and 
estoppel, to argue a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing in the contract, and to argue a breach of the 
0751 
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1 contract itself. Much more than simply coming into the Court 
2 and asking for a release of the lien. 
3 In connection with the motion for partial summary 
4 judgment which was filed on the same day, although it was 
5 styled as a motion to dismiss, it was submitted with nine 
6 affidavits, and I believe the Court's ruling was that in fact 
7 it had to be treated as a motion for partial summary judgment. 
8 In that motion they sought a summary and determination 
9 that the contract itself had expired. I think if you look at 
10 the pleadings between the parties, there was a great deal of 
11 briefing on whether or not the parties had waived their right, 
12 whether it had been extended by the parties, and again, much 
13 more than simply asking the Court to release a lien. 
14 It sought a decision from the Court that the lis 
15 pendens was wrongful. It sought a determination that CFI's 
16 claims were barred by the doctrine of latches. Sought release 
17 of the lis pendens for reasons of equity, but did not anywhere 
18 m there seek dismissal on the bases of mandatory arbitration. 
19 Mr. Gaylord has made reference to footnote 3 in their 
20 memorandum, which references the fact of arbitration, the 
21 arbitration provision. We would submit to the Court that 
22 there is a great difference between making the Court aware 
23 of an arbitration provision, and asking the Court to compel 
24 arbitration. We believe that in fact what they did is they 
25 used the arbitration provision as a means to get what they 
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1 wanted with the Court. 
2 The hearing then was held on January 10th. In that 
3 hearing there was no argument to the Court that it should 
4 compel arbitration. The Court issued its memorandum decision 
5 on January 14th, and in that memorandum decision, you set forth 
6 your reasons for affirming — or granting and denying in part 
7 the motion for partial summary judgment. 
8 I think that it's very significant, then, that from 
9 January 14th to March 8th, your Honor, there was no motion 
10 presented to the Court to compel arbitration in this case. 
11 Instead what happened is on February 4th, plaintiffs and 
12 defendants participated in a Rule 26-F conference. 
13 In that conference they agree upon a schedule of dates 
14 for litigation. They met and they talked about their claims, 
15 and in there Park West made no demand on CFI to pursue the 
16 arbitration. 
17 The parties agreed upon the form of a scheduling 
18 order that was presented to the Court, and again, there was no 
19 insistence that there be any reference at all to arbitration. 
20 Then finally a month after that, the parties exchanged initial 
21 disclosures, as they had agreed to do so in the Rule 26-F 
22 conference. 
23 Chandler, we believe, your Honor, is the controlling 
24 case. We agree that there are some differences between this 
25 case and Chandler. Some differences that may play in Park 
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1 West's favor, but also some differences that very much play in 
2 favor of CFI. In both cases, your Honor, there was a five-
3 month delay between the filing of the complaint and the — or 
4 excuse me. In Chandler there was a five-month delay. In this 
5 case there was a four month delay. Very similar. 
6 In Chandler there were — the Court noted there were 
7 affirmative defenses made to the complaint, but that there was 
8 no reference to the affirmative defenses to arbitration. In 
9 that case there were cross claims made against other parties, 
10 but no counterclaims. In our case there are counterclaims. 
11 Unlike in Chandler, Park West participated with CFI in 
12 scheduling dates for litigation, and doing the kinds of things 
13 that you would do in fact to express an intent to proceed with 
14 litigation rather than arbitration, and in this case, very 
15 significantly, unlike in Chandler, there was a motion for 
16 partial summary judgment. 
17 We would also — I just mentioned briefly the Taos 
18 case and the Wood case that were referred by the Court in 
19 Chandler. In the Taos case, again there was a motion for 
20 summary judgment. We think it's significant in that case 
21 that the Court noted that one of the affirmative defenses 
22 asserted by the defendant included a claim for arbitration. 
23 The Court said in that case that but for that mention of the 
24 arbitration provision, that the Court might well have presumed 
25 there to be a waiver, and in this case, again, there was no 
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1 reference to arbitration in the answer. 
2 In the Taos case, which was cited and relied upon by 
3 the Court throughout Chandler, the New Mexico Court stated 
4 that, quote, "The waiver of the right of arbitration may be 
5 inferred from the decision to take advantage of the judicial 
6 system, whether through discovery or direct invocation of the 
7 Court's discretionary power, or both." 
8 In the Wood case, which is quite similar to our case, 
9 in the Wood case that's cited by the Court in Chandler, there 
10 was no discovery. There was a motion for summary judgment. In 
11 that case the Court stated that, quote, "The point of no return 
12 is reached when the party seeking to compel arbitration invokes 
13 the Court's discretionary power prior to demanding arbitration 
14 on a question other than the demand for arbitration." The 
15 Court recognized that to hold otherwise would permit a party 
16 to resort to a Court action until an unfavorable decision had 
17 been reached and then switch to arbitration. 
18 It's our position here, your Honor, that Park West 
19 took a calculated risk. What it asked the Court to do, and 
20 it's very clear from its motion for summary judgment, is to 
21 dismiss the complaint and all of the claims, and be done with 
22 the matter. They hoped that what they could do is convince 
23 this Court that that was going to be the case. They got part 
24 of their relief in the lis pendens. They didn't get all of it. 
25 So they decided, "Well, then we ought now to go and try and go 
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1 back to the arbitration panel, do our 60 days, not agree, and 
2 then be out of it that way.'' 
3 In their briefing they cite the Williams case out of 
4 the Fifth Circuit. I would just like to touch upon that. That 
5 J case is quite distinguishable on one fact. That is that Signa, 
6 the defendant in the action, did not realize that it had the 
7 right to pursue arbitration. The Court found that as soon as 
8 they found that they had the right to arbitrate, they asserted 
9 it. Similarly they hadn't answered prior to the time that they 
10 moved to compel arbitration, and filed after. 
11 On the issue of prejudice, your Honor, my client has 
12 expended tens of thousands of dollars responding to a motion 
13 for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss all of the claims in 
14 this case. It was fully briefed. It was fully argued to the 
15 Court, and the Court in Chandler specifically mentioned that 
16 prejudice — one of the ways that prejudice can be shown is by 
17 briefing and arguing the dispositive motion. 
18 In addition to the briefing and arguing of the motion 
19 for summary judgment, we've spent time negotiating dates for 
20 the litigation, drafting the scheduling order, exchanging the 
21 initial disclosures. We have spent time drafting discovery 
22 requests that would have been filed the week following when 
23 we got the motion to compel, and there has been a four-month 
24 delay. 
25 Assuming that the arbitration provision was — their 
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1 interpretation of that provision is correct, this should have 
2 been resolved in two months. We're now six months down the 
3 line; four months before they even filed their motion to 
4 compel. 
5 One other point I wanted to raise is that filing a 
6 motion for summary judgment was not the logical response to the 
7 complaint if what Park West wanted was to pursue arbitration. 
8 The logical response would have been to file a motion to compel 
9 arbitration, and a motion -to dismiss based upon the terms of 
10 the contract, and had the Court in fact done that, if the Court 
11 had agreed with the interpretation of the contract, dismissed 
12 the action, there was no basis upon which to continue with a 
13 lis pendens. 
14 78-40-202 of the Utah Code provides the lis pendens 
15 is filed in connection with an action. If there is no action, 
16 there is no lis pendens. So what Park West needed to do if 
17 they wanted to pursue arbitration, was to present that argument 
18 to the Court. They didn't do that. Instead they sought to 
19 have all of their claims dismissed. 
20 Okay. I just want to talk briefly about the remedy 
21 provisions — or the dispute resolution provisions in the 
22 contract. As Park West has appropriately recognized, it is 
23 this Court's obligation to reconcile all of the terms and 
24 provisions of a contract. 
25 That is not what Park West is asking the Court to do. 
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1 Park West is asking the Court essentially to ignore paragraph 
2 15 of the contract, and paragraph 16 of the contract, which 
3 both talk about the seller's — or excuse me, the buyer's 
4 remedies, which included specific performance, and included 
5 the right to pursue damages. 
6 I think this was a very interesting exhibit, because 
7 essentially what it in a very real way shows to the Court is 
8 that if there was no right to pursue particular provisions, it 
9 was very easy for the parties to specify it in the contract by, 
10 in fact, crossing it out. I just want the Court to recognize 
11 this was not done. This provision remained in the contract, as 
12 did paragraph 16, which both gave to Park West — or excuse me, 
13 Central Florida Investments the right to pursue damages and 
14 specific performance. 
15 We would just submit that the addendum was intended to 
16 allow the parties to quickly resolve the dispute about terms, 
17 so that they could mutually proceed with the contract, and with 
18 the project. 
19 It was not a means to allow either party to get out 
20 on 60 days of arbitration/mediation the failure to agree and 
21 go their separate ways. Really, that interpretation only — 
22 I mean, that interpretation is very detrimental to Central 
23 Florida Investments. If they don't agree, our only remedy is 
24 we get back the earnest money. They're allowed to sell it to 
25 whoever they want and go forward with the project. I think 
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1 I that's all I have. 
2 I THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Payne. 
3 Final word, Mr. Gaylord. 
4 MR. GAYLORD: If I could, your Honor. Let me take 
5 up where he left off, which is sometimes a good place. The 
6 provision that he refers to doesn't make sense if the parties 
7 intended to simply resolve disputes. I mean, what happens if 
8 you don't resolve the dispute? The contract is null and void. 
9 To suggest that it was intended solely to — that if we have a 
10 disagreement about an agreement or a provision in the contract, 
11 then we'll go and try to figure that one out, and of course, 
12 we're going to do a mutual agreement, we're going to be a team 
13 to develop the property. 
14 If that were the case, then it would have had no 
15 purpose in drafting the language that's there that says if we 
16 can't reach an agreement through arbitration on the terms, and 
17 the dispute of the terms, it's null and void. 
18 So consequently I think it runs directly contrary, 
19 but again, it's very specific in its remedy. If you can't 
20 reach an agreement, and if the arbitration isn't successful, 
21 the contract is null and void. So I think that it doesn't 
22 make sense as well to the other side. 
23 As to the waiver argument, your Honor, I mean, I think 
24 you simply need to go to the November 12th letter. The November 
25 12th letter that we wrote to them four days after the complaint 
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1 — three days after complaint was filed indicated specifically 
2 the arbitration provision. Now, the fact that the arbitration 
3 didn't commence at that point is not indicative of the intent 
4 of the parties to arbitrate. 
5 Under the Chandler case, it requires a showing by 
6 the plaintiff m this case an inconsistency with intent to 
7 arbitrate. The November 12th letter is very specific, that the 
8 arbitration provision controls. They're the ones who continue 
9 to cite and who continue to proceed. We have one choice. 
10 Mr. Payne gets up and says, "Well, the way you should 
11 have done it is you should have filed this motion to compel 
12 arbitration, and simultaneously move to dismiss." I submit to 
13 your Honor that's exactly what we did. 
14 At the hearing the Court may recall we did not push 
15 and did not address in any detail the other grounds for why 
16 this case should be dismissed, other than the contract had 
17 terminated by its own terms. Then we focused almost entirely 
18 with that argument, and the specific performance and the 
19 wrongfulness of the lis pendens. 
20 Although our motions had a considerable amount more 
21 in them, the hearing focus was towards specific performance 
22 and m fact the provision in here that they aren't entitled, 
23 and the grounds upon which the specific performance they were 
24 not entitled to, which was the impossibility of the contract, 
25 and their failure to perform under the terms of the contract. 
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1 We indicated in that hearing the issue — although it was 
2 a gratuitous, I guess, statement that there is also an 
3 arbitration clause, and that's another remedy. 
4 Your Honor, there is a presumption against waiver 
5 when it comes to the arbitration clause, and I think the Court 
6 — it's their burden to come forward with sufficient evidence 
7 to demonstrate waiver from the get-go if we go back an look at 
8 his chart. 
9 I think it's important to recognize that the amount 
10 of work done really does not indicate and does not rise to the 
11 level of the Chandler case. Interestingly he fails to mention 
12 the November 12th letter in there, where we expressly reflect 
13 the issue of arbitration. The mere fact that we don't contain 
14 an affirmative defense for arbitration is belied by the fact 
15 that in the counterclaim over and over again we talk about the 
16 arbitration provision. 
17 Paragraph 14 of the complaint quotes directly the 
18 arbitration provision. That they're in breach of the contract 
19 because of the arbitration provision. That we're entitled to 
20 quiet title because of the arbitration breach. 
21 In addition, in the motion to dismiss, at paragraphs 
22 8, 29 and 30, in footnotes 2, 3 and 4, we make a reference to 
23 the arbitration provisions. So we submit to the Court that 
24 we were very cognizant of the issue of arbitration, that it 
25 certainly is a remedy both parties had before them, but we had 
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1 a more pressing issue. We had a lis pendens that had to be 
2 released, regardless of whether we proceeded with arbitration, 
3 on whether the contract terminated, or whether or not the 
4 earnest money was the sole remedy of which they were entitled 
5 to recover, based upon the breaches — the alleged breaches 
6 between the parties, based upon the interpretation of the 
7 contract. 
8 Your Honor, I submit to the Court we have provided the 
9 Court with substantial basis upon which the Court should compel 
10 arbitration, force the parties to go and meet the bargain that 
11 they agreed, which is arbitration under clause 12, and we would 
12 ask the Court to enter an order compelling arbitration, and 
13 dismiss the (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gaylord. I think there is 
15 a policy and it's continuing to evolve to favor arbitration 
16 agreements, and I think the Courts where they can, do compel 
17 arbitration. I think because one, it's a more rapid remedy; 
18 one, it's agreed upon between the parties; and perhaps — I 
19 hope that's not my motivation — is because it relieves the 
20 Court's docket somewhat. Nevertheless, people have a right 
21 to their day in Court, unless there is a clear arbitration 
22 alternative. 
23 Now, the waiver argument, there is certainly actions 
24 by the defendant that were inconsistent with the arbitration. 


























am not persuaded that waiver applies in this case, but that 
doesn't resolve the issue for me, because before a Court 
should order arbitration, I think it needs to be persuaded 
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that arbitration is a bonafide option. 
As I look at this case as carefully as I can, I look 
at the arbitration provision. I think it was appropriately 
used by the defendants and relied upon by the Court to some 
extent in ruling on the lis pendens and the other issues in 
January to determine that in fact there was any — it was 
evidence of the intent of the parties to not impede the 
project. I think that's clear, but the more I look at that 
provision, I think it's not even an arbitration provision. 
In any event, if I was to refer this matter or compel 
arbitration, I think I would be compelling plaintiffs to go 
into a forum where they are almost doomed to no remedy, nothing 
more than to be back where they were before, and I don't think 
that's an appropriate use of the arbitration mechanism. 
I'm denying the motion to compel. Would you prepare 
and order, Mr. Payne. 
MR. PAYNE: I will. 
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